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INTRODUCTION

Later this year, Congress will debate the reauthorization of Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which distributes nearly fifteen
billion dollars a year to public schools.' The purpose of the Act is to improve
the educational opportunities of poor students and to obligate those districts
receiving Title I funds to comply with various federal non-discrimination
statutes. Congress passed the first version of the Act in 1964 as part of the war
on poverty and included compliance with racial non-discrimination statutes as
a condition to receiving the funds. 2 The Act provided supplemental resources
for needy students, created a financial incentive for schools to desegregate, and
gave the federal government the practical power to force desegregation on
those schools that did not desegregate voluntarily.3 In subsequent years,
Congress imposed various additional non-discrimination and equity
requirements as conditions on schools that receive federal funds. 4
The Act, however, has strayed from its original purpose in recent years. In
particular, recent versions of Title I, such as the No Child Left Behind Act,5
have been used to spur general school reform and political agendas more than
to further non-discrimination and equity for poor students. 6 Although Title I

U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, FISCAL

YEAR 2010 app. (2009) (Summary of Discretionary Funds, Fiscal Years 2008-2010)
[hereinafter BUDGET SUMMARY], available at http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/
budget/budget]0/summary/l0summary.pdf.
2 JULIE Roy JEFFREY, EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965, at

27,67 (1978).
3 See GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS

AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 46, 77 (1969).
4 See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400-1482 (2006)
(requiring schools to provide free appropriate public education to students with disabilities);
id. §§ 1681-1688 (prohibiting gender discrimination); id. § 1706 (creating a right of action
for those denied equal educational opportunities); McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (2006) (ensuring homeless youths have "equal access to the
same free, appropriate public education" as other youths).
5 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
6 For instance, the Department of Education states that the four pillars of No Child Left
Behind, the most recent version of Title I, are "Stronger Accountability for Results," "More
Freedom for States and Communities," "Proven Education Methods," and "More Choices
for Parents." U.S. Dep't of Educ., Overview: Four Pillars of NCLB (July 1, 2004),
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html. Glaringly missing from these pillars
is the focus on equity and poor children. Official statements that No Child Left Behind is
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now requires schools to close the achievement gap for poor students, this is a
small part of the overall requirements that focus on the proficiency levels of all
students. 7 Moreover, Title I requires poor students to meet these same
proficiency levels without also requiring that they receive equitable resources.
In all fairness, the Act purports to require resource equity for poor children and
attempts to meet their specific needs, 8 but today these central components of
the legislation are often no more than symbolic. Title I's standards have been
weakened to the point where they no longer require real equity between
schools.9 The clearest expression of Title I's withdrawal from the furtherance
of equity is the caveat that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to
mandate equalized spending per pupil for a State, local educational agency, or
school."' 0 Even placing this caveat aside, Title I now entirely exempts major
categories of school budgets, such as teacher salaries, from any equity or
comparative analysis." Thus, school districts and states are essentially free to
distribute their resources in most any way they see fit.
States and school districts have taken this freedom and run with it. Rather
than using federal funds as part of a larger effort to improve and equalize
education for poor students, states and school districts have too often used the
federal funds as their exclusive or primary response to the needs of poor
students. Even with the assistance of federal funds, states and school districts
consistently spend less on the education of students that attend predominantly
poor schools than students who do not.12 Spending per pupil is $825 less in
schools with high levels of low-income students than in schools with low
levels of impoverished students.13 If one factors in the additional cost
associated with educating poor students, that gap actually jumps to over $1300
"working to close the achievement gap and make sure all students, including those who are
disadvantaged, achieve academic proficiency" suggest that poor children are but an excuse

to enter the field of education. Id.; see also Martha Derthick & Joshua M. Dunn, False
Premises: The Accountability Fetish in Education, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1015, 101617 (2009).
7 20 U.S.C. § 6311.
8 See id. § 6321(c) ("State and local funds will be used ... to provide services .. . at least
comparable to services in schools that are not receiving funds under this part."); see also id.
§ 6321(a) (indicating that an "educational agency may receive funds ... only if .. . the local
educational agency has maintained the agency's fiscal effort").
9 See, e.g., id. § 6321(c)(1)(B) (requiring only "substantially comparable" services
without setting any objective standards for comparability); id. § 7901 (permitting schools to
allow their funds to fall to ninety percent of the previous year's levels, in contrast to
previous standards that required ninety-five percent).
Id. § 6576.
Id. § 6321(c)(2)(b).
12THE EDUCATION TRUST, FUNDING GAPs 2006, at 7 tbl.3 (2006), available at
http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/CDEF9403-5A75-437E-93FF-EBFI 174181 FB/0/
FundingGap2006.pdf.
13 Id.
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per student.14 In an average elementary school of four hundred students, these
spending practices create an average shortfall of over $500,000 in each lowincome school. More important, these funding inequities are accompanied by
significant negative achievement consequences for poor students. Based on
the eighth grade national assessments in 2007, students in high-poverty schools
lag behind students in low-poverty schools by thirty-nine scaled points in
reading and forty-one points in math.15 These achievement gaps are equivalent
to approximately four years of learning.16 Thus, eighth grade students in highpoverty schools are earning scores equivalent to fourth graders in low-poverty
schools. Title I, however, in its current form, does little, if anything, to remedy
these problems.
The existence of resource inequities and the resulting inadequate
opportunities not only raise policy concerns, they also raise constitutional
concerns for both the schools and Congress. Recent scholarship emphasizes
the constitutional responsibility of states and school districts to address school
inequities and inadequacies,17 noting that all fifty states have a state
constitutional clause that obligates them to provide education.' 8 Moreover, a
majority of state supreme courts have interpreted these clauses to include a
qualitative or equitable standard that imposes specific obligations on the
state.19 Based on these state court decisions and other factual developments in
states, recent scholarship demonstrates that when a state fails to carry out its
state-based educational obligations it not only violates its state constitution, it
often also violates federal equal protection. 20 This Article addresses whether

14 Id.; see also infra note 47 (discussing the higher cost of securing quality teachers in
high needs schools); infra notes 177-78 (discussing the amount of additional funding that
low-income students require).
15 INST. OF EDUC. Scis., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDuc. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION
2009, at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf (comparing students in schools with less than ten
percent poverty to schools with more than seventy-five percent poverty).
16 Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, NAT'L CTR. FOR

THE STUDY OF PRIVATIZATION IN EDUC., CHARTER, PRIVATE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT: NEw EVIDENCE FROM NAEP MATHEMATICS DATA 5 (2006),

available at http://www.ncspe.org/publicationsfiles/OP Ill .pdf (explaining that ten to
eleven points are equivalent to approximately one grade level when interpreting National
Assessment of Educational Progress mathematics exam scores).
" See generally Derek W. Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutionswith Equal
Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
'8 See Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under
State ConstitutionalLaw, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 96-97 (1989).
19 See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1527 (2007) (discussing the outcomes
in school finance cases at the state level).
20 Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 5-6).
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Congress has a Fourteenth Amendment responsibility to respond to these
constitutional violations and, if so, whether Title I is consistent with that
responsibility.
The question of whether Congress has a duty is the more complicated of the
two. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens equal protection of the
laws, but it also grants Congress the power to enforce equal protection. 2 1 This
grant of power gives Congress the authority to address school inequalities, but
whether this grant of power obligates Congress to address inequalities is less
certain. Viewed independently, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
suggests that Congress's enforcement power includes a significant amount of
discretion. 22 But the basic language and nature of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment powers are distinct from that of other constitutional powers that
are inherently and entirely discretionary. 23 These distinctions suggest that
Congress's discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike other powers,
is not unlimited. Further comparison and analysis suggest that Congress is
obligated to act in the face of known equal protection violations, but has wide
discretion in how it acts. Yet even if Congress has no obligation to act, reason
dictates that any action that Congress voluntarily takes must be consistent with
the Amendment's equal protection guarantee. Since Congress, in enacting
Title I, has already entered the field of education, identifying a preexisting duty
to remedy inequality becomes less important. Congress now must ensure that
Title I furthers, rather than undermines, equal protection.
As currently enacted, Title I fails to satisfy this requirement. Even worse,
Title I actually sanctions, undermines, and exacerbates educational inequalities
in several respects. First, the Title I funding formulas rely on irrational factors
to distribute funds. As a result, they randomly and disproportionately drive
resources to some school districts and deprive other districts, which
undermines both equity and the goal of meeting student needs. 24 For instance,
the formulas guarantee a certain level of funding to small states regardless of
the number of poor students who live there. 25 Because these small states tend
to have smaller percentages of poor students, they receive more Title I funds
per pupil than many other states with higher levels of poverty. 26 The formulas
also increase the funding per pupil as the size of the district grows,

21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

See id. § 5 ("Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.").
23 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 11.
24 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6333 (2006) (basing funding on states' per-pupil expenditures);
id. § 6334 (guaranteeing small states a fixed amount regardless of need); id. § 6335(c)(1)(B)
22

(capping the weight for concentrated poverty at 29.20% poverty); id. § 6335(c)(1)(C)
(weighting funding based on the total number of children in a school district).
25 Id. § 6334.
26 THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 3 tbl.1.
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advantaging large school districts over small districts. 27 However, the size of a
school district does not correlate with geographic costs or the percentage of
poor students therein.28 In addition, although the formulas exponentially
increase the Title I funds per pupil as the percentage of poor students in a
school district approaches thirty, the formulas stop exponentially increasing
funds beyond that point.29 Yet student need continues to increase, if not
skyrocket, as the percentage of poor students rises above thirty percent. 30
Finally, the formulas allot money based on each state's per-pupil expenditure
on education. 31 As a result, the richest states receive the most Title I dollars
and the poorest states receive the fewest. In all fairness, richer states generally
have higher locality costs as well, but these states do not uniformly have
significant levels of poor students whereas poor states more often do. 32In
short, these funding formula flaws provide fewer funds to the schools and
students who need the funds most, forcing them to make their Title I dollars
stretch further than other schools. In this respect, rather than narrowing
inequities, Title I expands them. It takes money and resources that poor
students and schools need and delivers them elsewhere.
The second categorical failure to carry out equal protection is far more
obvious. Title I includes symbolic statements regarding equity, but the actual
standards do little to require equity. Rather, Title I ignores some inequities and
sanctions others. For instance, to ensure that schools do not reduce their local
funding and replace it with federal dollars - which would produce a net result
of zero gain for poor students - Title I includes a standard that requires school

27

20 U.S.C. § 6335(c)(1)(C).

28

U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TITLE I FUNDING: POOR CHILDREN BENEFIT THOUGH

FUNDING PER POOR CHILD DIFFERS

d02242.pdf.
29 20 U.S.C. § 6335(c)(1)(B).
30 See JAMES S. COLEMAN

33 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
21-22 (1966); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL
TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 25-31 (2000)
[hereinafter KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now]; RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY
ET AL.,

EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

FOUND., RESCUING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATIoN: PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS
PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION
CENTURY

FOUND],

districtprofiles.pdf; UNC

available

at

6-7 (2007) [hereinafter KAHLENBERG, THE
http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/

CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE

1-4 (2005),
availableat http://www.law.unc.edul documents/civilrights/briefs/charlottereport.pdf; Molly
S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public
Schools, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1334, 1335 (2004) (arguing the best way to reach the goal of
Brown is desegregation by economic class); see also INST. FOR EDUC. Scis., supra note 15, at
153, 157 (showing a decrease in student achievement with each increase in the percentage
of poor students in a school).
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION IN STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICY

31 20 U.S.C. § 6333.
32 THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 3 tbl. 1.
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districts to maintain their state and local funding contribution from the
previous year.33 But that same standard permits school districts to draw down
their current funding to ninety percent of the previous year. 34 Given that
federal funds are on average only eight percent of schools' education
budgets, 35 school districts could theoretically reduce their local contribution by
eight percent, replace that reduction with federal funds, and still meet the
requirement of maintaining their local funding at ninety percent of the previous
year. Although such action would clearly subvert the entire purpose of Title I,
it would not violate the maintenance-of-effort standard. Furthermore, other
standards that should catch this subversion simply go unenforced in practice. 36
A more glaring omission is Title I's comparability standard, which on its
face states that Title I schools must provide services comparable to other
schools. 37 But like the maintenance-of-effort standard, the comparability
standard is watered down to the point of ineffectiveness. Rather than focusing
on concrete resource comparisons, the current standard is based on the
ambiguous and subjective concept of comparable overall "services." 38
Moreover, the Act effectively eviscerates comparison of actual resources by
exempting major portions of state and school budgets from scrutiny. Title I
exempts teacher salaries from comparison even though they are the largest
portion of most schools' budgets. 39 To establish comparability in this area, a
school district need only show that it has a uniform salary schedule for all the
teachers in the district, regardless of how those teachers are distributed. 40
Finally, Title I's comparability standards do not even apply to inequities
between school districts. Thus, states are free to allocate resources among
their school districts in any way they wish, regardless of the level of inequity
they might create. In short, Title I no longer requires equity between schools
or school districts, and the prevailing reality of inequity has simply become
irrelevant.
Congress's third, and least excusable, categorical failure to carry out its
equal protection duty is its total disregard for states' and school districts'
obligations under their state constitutions and statutes. As noted above,
violations of state constitutions and statutes can also amount to violations of
federal equal protection. 4 1 Notwithstanding the fact that numerous states have
20 U.S.C. § 6321(a) (conditioning receipt of funds on maintaining "fiscal effort").
34 Id. § 7901 (requiring that expenditures be at least ninety percent of the "combined
fiscal effort or aggregate expenditures for the second preceding fiscal year").
3 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING 2 (2005),
http://www.ed.gov/aboutloverview/fed/10facts/10facts.pdf.
36 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 25.
3 20 U.S.C. § 632 1(c)(2).
* Id. (referring to "services ... taken as a whole").
39 Id.
40 Id. § 6321(c)(2)(A)(i).
41 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33
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been or currently are subject to state court orders as a result of their
violations, 42 Congress has never conditioned federal funding on states' and
school districts' compliance with these obligations. Congress has simply
proceeded as though students' rights under state constitutions, and by
extension the Federal Constitution, do not exist. 43
The Fourteenth Amendment demands a response to these existing inequities.
Congress's willingness to reinvigorate Title I as a tool of equal protection,
however, is unclear. Currently, a largely unnoticed Student Bill of Rights,
which would cure some of the aforementioned problems, is pending before
Congress.44 But the wider conversation regarding reauthorization of Title I has
yet to acknowledge the need for equitable change. 45 In fact, the current United
States Secretary of Education recently credited the last version of Title I, No
Child Left Behind, with focusing on "outcomes, rather than inputs." 46 Such
statements fail to acknowledge that input inequities are not disconnected from
disparities in student outcomes. 47 Moreover, these input inequities are at the
core of equal protection concerns.
42 See SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY app. at
345-58 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (listing the judgments in school
finance cases).
43 See Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 5) (demonstrating that changes in state law
over the past two decades have elevated education to a substantive constitutional right under
state law and, thus, educational inequities would require elevated scrutiny under federal
equal protection regardless of whether the federal constitution independently recognizes a
right to education); infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
' Student Bill of Rights, H.R. 2451, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
45 See, e.g., Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., Reauthorization of ESEA: Why We
Can't Wait, Remarks at the Monthly Stakeholders Meeting (Sept. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/09/09242009.html (identifying the current flaw of
Title I as being the focus on standardized tests rather than high learning standards).
46 Id.
47 See generally COMM. ON EDUC. FIN., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING MONEY

MATTER: FINANCING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999)

(analyzing the need for adequate funding and the ways to maximize the effect of funding on
student outcomes); MICHAEL A. REBELL & JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI, THE CAMPAIGN FOR
FISCAL EQUITY,

INC.,

OF COURSE MONEY MATTERS:

WHY THE ARGUMENTS

TO THE

UP (2004), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/
resource center/researchlMoneyMattersFeb2004.pdf (providing an overview of the research
and court opinions on the importance of these inputs and resources to secure them). In fact,
access to the most important factor in student achievement, teacher quality, is directly tied to

CONTRARY

NEVER

ADDED

money. See ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS

IN Low-PERFORMING

HIGH SCHOOLS

7

(2008), available at http://www.all4ed.org/

files/TeachDistPolicyBrief.pdf (indicating that several states already have incentive pay for
low-performing schools, but pay increase alone is insufficient to attract teachers); Eric A.
Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 326, 350 (2004)
(finding that a roughly ten percent salary increase would be necessary for each increase of
ten percent in minority student enrollment to induce white females to teach in the school);
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This Article seeks to insert equity and student need into the Title I
reauthorization conversation and offers a series of recommendations that
would cure most of Title I's constitutional flaws. In short, this Article
proposes that Congress: (1) condition the receipt of federal funds on
compliance with state constitutional and statutory obligations; (2) require
equitable funding and resource distribution between schools and districts; (3)
create a private cause of action to enforce these provisions; and (4) incentivize
the foregoing compliance through funding formulas so as to prevent undue
hardships as school systems transition toward equity. Not only would these
recommendations cure constitutional flaws, they would restore the federal
government to its proper role as a leader in education equality rather than a
disinterested party.
I.

THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS'S RESPONSIBLITY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT

Although rarely tested or analyzed, one of the foremost means of improving
educational opportunities for disadvantaged children may be exploring
Congress's constitutional responsibility for addressing educational inequities,
rather than focusing solely on whether students have an equal protection claim
in court. A congressional responsibility would presumptively lead to far
greater improvement in education than any number of lawsuits. Moreover, if
Congress has such a duty, the duty would call into question whether
Congress's current funding of public schools is consistent with its
constitutional duty or actually runs contrary to it. To the extent Congress has a
duty, it rests in the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, although the
Amendment explicitly grants Congress power to enforce equal protection, the
Amendment's language does not provide an explicit or obvious answer to
whether that enforcement power is mandatory or discretionary.
A.

The Relevance of JudicialInterpretation

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states afford all
persons within their jurisdiction equal protection of the law.4 8 This Section
provides the basis for private citizens to bring suit against state actors when
they believe they have been the victim of discrimination and other forms of
disparate treatment. The courts have entertained thousands of cases under
Section One and thoroughly explored its contours. In contrast, Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not speak to the rights of citizens. Instead,
id. at 351 (finding that a twenty-five to forty percent salary increase would be necessary to
induce white female teachers with two or fewer years of experience to transfer from a
suburban to an urban school); Bill Turque, In Second Year, Rhee Is Facing Major Tests;
ChancellorIs National Figure, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 2008, at DZO 1 (discussing a proposal
to raise teacher salaries to $120,000 "in exchange for concessions on tenure and linkage of
pay to student performance" and teachers' resistance).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Section Five speaks to Congress's responsibility regarding equal protection,
indicating that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." 49
Although it has not done so regularly, the Supreme Court has addressed this
grant of congressional power on a few occasions when litigants have
challenged civil rights legislation as exceeding Congress's authority. For
instance, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,5 0 the plaintiffs argued that congressional
legislation invalidating New York's requirement that all voters be able to read
and write in English was unconstitutional. 51 The issue in the case was whether
Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was
limited to simply furthering and enforcing the federal courts' equal protection
decrees and interpretations, or whether Congress had authority independent of
the courts. The Supreme Court found that Congress's power was not confined
to the dictates of the judiciary, writing:
"It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged[ by the Fourteenth
Amendment]. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by
appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the
amendments fully effective." A construction of § 5 that would require a
judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by
Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the
congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional
resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the
Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this context to the
insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial
branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing
the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the "majestic
generalities" of § 1 of the Amendment. 52
Thus, the Court's inquiry of Congress's equal protection legislation does not
focus on whether the behavior Congress is attempting to prohibit violates the
Equal Protection Clause, but whether the legislation is "appropriate"
legislation to enforce the Clause. 53
Many argue that because Congress has the independent authority to identify
and rectify equal protection violations of its own volition, it necessarily has the
power to interpret the Constitution more broadly than the courts. 54 Judicial
49 Id. §
50

5.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).

"' Id. at 643.
52 Id. at 648-49 (citation omitted).
5 Id. at 648 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).
54 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116

YALE L.J. 330, 338 (2006); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act,
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interpretations of equal protection only mark the boundary of courts' own
enforcement of the Constitution, not Congress's. 55 Given this distinction, "the
adjudicated Constitution often falls short of exhausting the substantive
meaning of the Constitution's open-textured guarantees," such as equal
protection. 56 Moreover, independent and broader congressional authority is a
practical necessity if equal protection is to be consistently enforced. In many
respects, courts simply lack the capacity or power to enforce the Constitution
to its full extent and in all instances. Congress, in contrast, has the ability
through funding, administrative structures, and legislation to exercise more
expansive power.57
The foregoing, however, does not mean that Congress has the power to
enact legislation that directly contradicts or attempts to overturn judicial
interpretations of equal protection. In recent decisions, the Court has made it
clear that Congress lacks this power.58 The Court has further indicated that
Congress needs an evidentiary basis for believing that enforcing equal
protection is necessary. 59 Thus, it is not free to pursue unrelated policies under
the guise of enforcing equal protection. These caveats, however, do not
suggest that Congress lacks authority to interpret and enforce equal protection,
but rather that those interpretations and enforcements cannot blatantly
contradict the Court's.60
B.

DistinguishingMandatory,Discretionary,and Intermediate Duties

Determining the scope of congressional authority under equal protection
only resolves the matter of whether Congress can intervene in a given
situation, and this Article does not challenge Congress's power to remedy
equal protection violations. Rather, the salient question for this Article is the
extent to which congressional action in response to equal protection violations
is mandatory, entirely discretionary, or something in between. The language
of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to act, but does not

112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003); Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1212 (1978).
5 Sager, supra note 54, at 1213.
56 Liu, supra note 54, at 338.
57 It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress
does need a factual and legal basis for acting, so as to ensure that its exercise of Section Five
power is remedial rather than political or an attempt to usurp or counteract the Court's
holdings. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526-27 (1997).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000); Boerne, 521 U.S. at
524.
5 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 ("The business of the courts is to review the congressional
assessment ... for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact.").

60 For further discussion of the competing views of Congress's Section Five authority,
see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 299-300 (3d ed.

2006).
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explicitly mandate the exercise of this power. Yet, neither does the language
indicate the opposite: that Congress "may," rather than "shall," act in the face
of equal protection violations.
Analyzing Congress's Section Five power, Goodwin Liu argues that a grant
of power does not automatically carry with it a grant of full discretion. "[T]he
concepts of power and duty - and authority and responsibility - do not always
travel separately." 61 Liu's notion recognizes that the discretionary language in
Section Five refers to the type of legislation that Congress might enact, not the
choice of whether to enact legislation. Having the power to determine what
legislation is "appropriate" 62 is not equivalent to having the power to determine
whether enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment itself is appropriate. Yet,
discretion regarding what legislation to enact must in some instances include
the discretion to determine that no legislation is appropriate. In short, the basic
language of the Amendment is ambiguous as to the exact nature of Congress's
duty or discretion.
Analyzing the language of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
overall context of other constitutional congressional powers and the structure
of the Amendment itself offers more clarity. Several other constitutional
congressional powers are prefaced with the same language as Section Five.
Article One, Section Eight, mirroring Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, indicates "Congress shall have Power To" 63 and then proceeds to
enumerate eighteen distinct powers that Congress shall have.64 Among the
eighteen powers enumerated in Article One, Section Eight are powers such as
that "To declare War" 65 and to regulate commerce. 66 Article One, however,
provides no context for these powers. Rather, it simply executes broad grants
of power that are by their very nature left open to Congress. For instance, the
basic grant of power "To declare War"67 offers no basis to infer that Congress
is obligated to declare war against anyone, at any time, or under any
circumstances. Rather, by granting Congress an un-circumscribed power,
Congress could use its discretion and never declare war.68 Thus, the grant of
power comes with discretion to exercise the power only should Congress so

61 Liu, supra note 54, at 363.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
63 Id. art. I, § 8.
6 Id.
65 Id. cl. 11.
66 Id. cl. 3.
67 Id. cl. 11.
68 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1319 (1973) (holding that Article One,
Section Eight, Clause Eleven gives only Congress the power to declare war); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (stating that the Constitution gives the President power to
wage war, which Congress, rather than the President, has declared); see JOHN HART ELY,
62

WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3

(1993).
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choose. The same applies to the power to regulate Commerce. Congress
clearly has the power to regulate commerce, 69 but very well could choose
never to exercise it. 70 In fact, this was Congress's approach at various points
in United States history and even today, Congress has yet to exercise its
commerce power fully. 7 1 Yet, there is no suggestion that the failure to entirely
dominate interstate commerce is a dereliction of duty. In short, these Article
One grants of power are entirely discretionary.
Further reinforcing the discretionary nature of these powers is the fact that
they do not create a responsibility toward, or right on behalf of, any entity
other than Congress. Under Congress's Article One, Section Eight powers, no
individual, constituent, or state has a right to declare war, to regulate interstate
commerce, to borrow money in the name of the United States, to have a certain
type of money coined, or to exercise several other powers listed in Section
Eight.72 Thus, one could not demand anything of Congress in these respects,
nor suggest Congress was derelict in its duty if it failed to act. In effect,
Congress's Article One, Section Eight powers are powers of exclusion. The
grant of congressional power excludes others from acting in these areas or, at
least, supplant other actors who may have concurrent power in these areas. 73
The Fourteenth Amendment's structure, however, is entirely different,
suggesting that the Section Five grant of power is not entirely discretionary.
First, Section Five is not a basic grant of power unconnected to other legal
rights or obligations. The Fourteenth Amendment, in whole, grants legally
enforceable individual rights. 74 In fact, Section One of the Amendment
explicitly creates vast individual rights, the protection of which is the foremost
purpose of the Amendment. 75 Thus, Section Five does not stand alone as a

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7o The history of congressional regulation of commerce is gradual regulation where
previously there was none. Prior to 1937, however, the Court regularly acted to limit
Congress's commerce power. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 245
(1936); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895). But after 1937, the Court
has consistently allowed Congress to expand its commerce power and reclaim those areas
from which the Court previously excluded Congress. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at
254-64.
71 Consider the freedom of the internet and the relative lack of regulation and taxation of
its use.
72 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 242-87.
73 Id. at 236-42.
74 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
7 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (overturning a statute that deprived
students of the opportunity to attend school and would have created an "underclass" because
69

it was contrary to the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379

U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("[A] central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.").
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broad or undefined power, but rather is linked to, and given substance by, these
individual rights.
Second, Section Five is not an exclusionary power. While the power to
regulate commerce gives Congress the ability to exclude states from acting in
the area, 76 Congress's Section Five power does not do the same for equal
protection. The Amendment does not prevent states from acting in the field of
equal protection. In fact, most states have their own equal protection clauses
and on occasion act progressively in implementing them. 77 The point of
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is to further strengthen the effect of
Section One by tethering Congress to it and making it clear that Congress, in
addition to the states and the courts, has a responsibility to enforce the rights
therein. 78 As Goodwin Liu writes, Section Five "speaks directly to Congress
and independently binds Congress to its commands." 79
Third and most important, Section Five cannot be entirely discretionary
because the primary right to equal protection, unlike other congressional
powers, does not belong to Congress; the primary right belongs to the
individual.80 Thus, under Section Five, Congress has a responsibility to the
individual and to the protection of specifically identified rights of the
individual. In contrast, to the extent any of Congress's other powers create any
responsibility or constituency, the responsibility is to Congress itself, and
Congress can presumably be trusted with acting responsibly to protect its own
powers and rights. The same is not necessarily true in regard to protecting or
respecting others.
In short, these distinctions indicate that unlike Congress's Article One,
Section Eight powers, Congress's Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five
powers are not entirely discretionary. However, ruling out the notion that
Congress's power is entirely discretionary does not dictate that Congress's
duty is entirely mandatory. Again, the language of Section Five explicitly
contradicts a specific mandatory duty, granting Congress the power to
determine what legislation is "appropriate." 8'
Congress's Section Five power appears to fall somewhere between a nondiscretionary and completely discretionary duty. The most appropriate
6 Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 344 (1900) (recognizing the exclusive power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
n See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983); Sheff v.
O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Conn. 1996).
7 See Post & Siegel, supra note 54, at 1945-48; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist
Sess. 2768 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (stating that Section Five "imposes upon
Congress this power and this duty" to enforce all sections of the Amendment). Significant
debate, however, exists regarding the extent to which Congress can interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment independent of the courts. Post & Siegel, supra note 54, at 2003.
79 Liu, supra note 54, at 339.
so U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (indicating in Section One that the right to equal protection
belongs "to any person within [a state's] jurisdiction").
'1Id. § 5.

HeinOnline -- 90 B.U. L. Rev. 326 2010

2010]

EQUAL PROTECTION & EDUCATION

327

characterization of the power would be an intermediate duty that obligates
Congress to act, but reserves to Congress the discretion as to how to act. More
specifically, Congress can exercise discretion as to how best to enforce the
rights in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it cannot exercise
discretion as to whether to protect those rights. Thus, Congress does have a
"duty" to enforce Section One, or as the Court in Katzenbach characterized it,
a "responsibility." 82
Attempting to resolve the dichotomy here, Liu analogizes Congress's
Section Five duty to that of executive and judicial branch officers. Police
officers, for instance, have been afforded wide discretion in providing police
protection and, in most cases, are given immunity against individual suit when
exercising this discretion. 83 The basis for this discretion, however, is not that
the police have no duty to protect citizens, but that the police have a duty to
protect society at large and need flexibility in determining how to provide this
protection to the public given police departments' limited resources. 84 Thus, to
say that police have discretion in providing protection is not to say that the
police can simply refuse to provide protection services, but rather that they
have discretion in how they provide those services. Similarly, statutes and the
Constitution grant the judiciary both jurisdiction over certain types of cases
and discretion in determining whether a case actually falls within their grant of
jurisdiction.85 This discretion, however, is not intended to permit courts to
reject cases that they find are within their jurisdiction; rather, they have a duty
to accept these cases. 86 In short, the judicial "discretion exists against a
presumption that courts must exercise the jurisdiction they are given, as

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
* Liu, supra note 54, at 363-64; see also, e.g., Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299,
302-03 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield a government
official from liability based on the performance of discretionary functions." (citing
Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001))).
I See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-61 (2005) (finding that there
is no individual right to police protection, but that the police owe a legal duty of protection
to the public in general); Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 866 (N.Y. 1968).
85 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (indicating that the "court
generally retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367, over pendent state-law claims").
86 See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (discussing the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them"); England v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964)
("'When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction . . . .' (quoting Willcox v. Consol. Gas
Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909))); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)
(stating that federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which
is given, than to usurp that which is not").
82
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'[a]uthority to act necessarily implies a correlative responsibility.' "87
Similarly, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the
discretion as to what type of legislation is appropriate, but that discretion
comes with a duty to enforce equal protection.
C.

The Duty to Act Consistent with Equal Protection

Although Congress might have a duty under Section Five, Congress is
largely responsible for policing itself in fulfilling this duty. Its discretion as to
how to act, even in the face of a duty to act, could easily amount to an empty
promise of equal protection enforcement. As a practical matter, Congress
could use its discretion to eviscerate the effect of its duty. Liu argues,
however, that the concept of good faith still operates as a limitation on
Congress's discretion in carrying out its Section Five duty.88 Just as the
President is charged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 89 So
too is Congress expected to act in good faith in exercising its discretion in
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 90 A good faith standard would be
consistent with the lines that courts have drawn when police officers and
governmental agencies are liable for their actions.9 1 Such a standard, however,
only acts as a check on institutional actors that are clearly outside of their
power or entirely derelict in their duty. All other congressional actions would
largely be beyond challenge.
Any number of situations might arise where Congress makes choices of how
to enforce equal protection, and those choices can lead to deleterious or
ineffective results. Conversely, Congress might simply choose to refrain from
acting, assuming that a state actor or the judicial system would resolve the
matter. To the extent any of these choices were arguably rational and were
undertaken with the purpose of protecting Fourteenth Amendment rights, most
of these situations would likely fall within the category of good faith efforts. 92
Thus, as a practical matter, forcing Congress to affirmatively enforce equal
protection in a situation where it has chosen otherwise might be impossible.
Although not helpful in regard to the vast majority of contested
congressional actions, a good faith standard does create a narrow but definitive
Liu, supra note 54, at 364 (alteration in original) (quoting David L. Shapiro,
Jurisdictionand Discretion,60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 575 (1985)).
88 Id. at 363-66, 408-09.
89 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
90 Liu, supra note 54, at 408-09.
9' See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (recognizing immunity for officers
who act in good faith); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984) (extending the
qualified immunity defense to officials that violate state regulations or federal constitutional
provisions).
92 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1975) (writing that actions taken
within the bounds of reason based on the circumstances would be in good faith and, thus,
not subject the state actor to liability).
87

HeinOnline -- 90 B.U. L. Rev. 328 2010

2010]

EQUAL PROTECTION & EDUCATION

329

limit on some actions. Upon choosing to act, Congress, at the very least,
cannot act in ways that are antithetical to its duty or good faith efforts to
execute that duty. In areas other than equal protection, this point is clear. For
instance, Congress has the constitutional power to establish uniform rules of
naturalization, which means that Congress would be prohibited from
establishing inconsistent naturalization laws that operate differently from
person to person or state to state.93 The meaning of equal protection and the
duty to enforce it are not nearly as simple to define, but the principle still
operates.
In particular, when congressional action is not just a failed effort at
furthering equality, but rather is an act that actually sanctions and furthers
inequality, Congress would violate its Section Five duty. Of course, some of
these actions might be direct violations of equal protection,94 making Section
Five irrelevant. For instance, during the 1960s, Congress could have attempted
to continue the segregation of public schools by conditioning the receipt of
federal funds on schools offering education in single-race buildings. This
action would have been a violation of equal protection itself because its intent
and effect would have been to discriminate. 9 5 Other actions, however, might
be inconsistent with Section Five without amounting to a direct violation of
equal protection. For instance, suppose that Congress was agnostic toward
school segregation and placed no conditions on the receipt of federal funds. If
Congress created a general school construction fund, schools might have
applied for and used these funds to construct single-race schools. As a
practical matter, it is possible that in the south all of these funds could have
gone toward building new white-only schools. Could anyone seriously argue
that Congress's funding of the building of new white schools, regardless of
intent, was not a violation of its duty to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment? 96
If segregated schools were unconstitutional per Brown v. Board of Education,97

93 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) ("Congress' power is to
'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.' A congressional enactment construed so as to
permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements
for federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this explicit
constitutional requirement of uniformity." (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4)).
94 If Congress directly denied citizens equal protection, that denial would be a violation
of the Fifth Amendment rather than Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the
Fourteenth Amendments prohibits states from denying equal protection and the Fifth
Amendment prohibits Congress from denying citizens equal protection. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
95 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (setting discriminatory intent, in addition to disparate effect, as the basis for a
constitutional violation).
96 The Court poses a similar question in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618, 641 (1969),
and indicates the answer is no.
7 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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then the expenditure of federal funds to continue those schools is nothing less
than antithetical to Congress's Section Five duty.
The Court in Katzenbach, likewise, furthered the notion that Congress is
prohibited from acting antithetical to, or inconsistent with, equal protection.
Relying on basic constitutional interpretation principles from M'Culloch v.
Maryland,98 the Court in Katzenbach wrote that the line between constitutional
and unconstitutional action is "whether [an act] may be regarded as an
enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, whether it is 'plainly
adapted to that end' and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with
the 'letter and spirit of the constitution."' 99 The Court further added that:
[Section] 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] does not grant Congress
power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes
so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of
this Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress ho power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to
establish racially segregated systems of education would not be - as
required by § 5 - a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause
since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws. 100
More recently, the Court in Saenz v. Roe'0 1 reinforced this concept of
Congress's Section Five power, writing that Congress is "prohibited from
passing legislation that purports to validate" or sanction violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 102
In sum, although Congress has discretion as to how to act, Congress has a
duty to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, even the discretion in
deciding how to act is not without limits. Congress must act in good faith in
executing its duty and is prohibited from acting in a manner that is antithetical
to equal protection. It cannot undermine or dilute equal protection, but rather
must act to enhance it. Thus, the issue that the remainder of this Article must
address is whether Congress's funding of public schools undermines equal
protection or is, at least, arguably an attempt to further equal protection. Of
course, Congress has latitude in regard to the latter, but none as to the former.
D.

The Limitation on Private Causes ofAction to Enforce Congress's Duty

Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasize that the question
of whether Congress's action is unconstitutional under Section Five of the

98 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
99 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (quoting M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 421).

0 Id. at 651-52 n.10.

1o'526 U.S. 489 (1999).
102Id. at 508.
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Fourteenth Amendment is distinct from the question of whether an individual
can challenge Congress's action in court. The above analysis speaks solely to
the constitutionality of Congress's actions under Section Five, regardless of an
individual's standing to sue under Section Five or any other basis. To have a
cause of action, a plaintiff must suffer an individual injury and have standing
to sue in regard to that injury. 103 Direct violations of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment often create such an injury. Individuals who do not
suffer a direct injury might instead attempt to pursue a generalized grievance
as a taxpayer, but this strategy would likewise require proof that the challenged
action violates Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 4
Congress could, however, violate or fail to carry out its Section Five duty to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment without actually engaging in a direct
violation of equal protection. A mere congressional dereliction in protecting
racial minorities from discrimination, for instance, would not necessarily
amount to a denial of equal protection to an individual because the Supreme
Court has held that intentional discrimination is necessary to establish a
claim.105
Of course, if congressional action amounted to intentional
discrimination, an individual suffering injury from that discrimination could
sue directly under the prohibition against the denial of equal protection and
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment would be largely irrelevant. 106 But
whether an individual might have the right to sue for congressional derelictions
of duty is not central to this Article's thesis. Rather, the point of this Article is
that some congressional action that undermines equal protection or fails to
enforce equal protection is unconstitutional, and thus demands correction, even
if an individual could not force this correction in court.
With that said, it is still worth recognizing that when Congress attempts to
further equal protection or any other end through financial incentives, the
courts have placed some limits on Congress's spending power, and have
103See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 62-63 (detailing the need for concrete harm).

10 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007) (Alito, J.,
plurality opinion) (placing further limitations on individual challenges to spending
legislation). The cases discussed above involve plaintiffs who suffered individual harm
from the legislation in question, whereas Hein involves a citizen challenging spending
legislation based primarily on First Amendment principles. Id. at 592. In short, the plaintiff
does not suffer an individual harm and, thus, is proceeding based on taxpayer standing. Id.
at 593. In such a situation, the plaintiff faces not only the challenge of proving
unconstitutional action but also a link between their taxpayer status and the challenged
legislation. Id. at 602. The Court in Hein narrows plaintiffs' ability to establish that link,
primarily based on the Court's own concern with overstepping its separation of powers
limitation. Id. at 611-12. In contrast, the cases above involve plaintiffs with live injuries
rather than general taxpayer grievances.
"os Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
106Of course, the individual's claim under these circumstances would be under the Fifth
rather than Fourteenth Amendment, as the Fourteenth operates against state actors while the
Fifth operates against federal actors. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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recognized a cause of action when Congress transgresses those limits.1 07
Individual standing to sue under the Spending Clause is relatively narrow
because Congress's spending powers are themselves so broad. 08 The Court,
however, has held that Congress is not free to spend money in any way it sees
fit.109 The Court in South Dakota v. Dole identified four basic parameters for
congressional spending.I10 First, the spending must be in pursuit of the general
welfare."' Second, any conditions that Congress places on the receipt of funds
must be unambiguous.11 2 Third, any conditions that "are unrelated 'to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs'
may be
illegitimate." 3 Finally and of more importance to equal protection, all
congressional spending must comply with "other constitutional provisions[,
which] may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal
funds."' 14
The independent bar restriction on congressional spending means that
Congress cannot use its spending power "to induce the States to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional."' 1s To establish that
congressional spending is unconstitutional based on an independent bar, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the underlying activity of the federal funding
recipient is itself unconstitutional.116 In the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the independent bar prong would simply ask whether the
underlying activity of the funding recipient violates Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the funding recipient were a private rather than
state actor, the question would be whether the activity would be
unconstitutional if a state rather than private actor were carrying it out. Thus,
the law of the relevant independent constitutional clause at issue controls the
inquiry under this prong.
The second prong, however, is unique to the Spending Clause and tends to
be the determinative and more complicated inquiry in these cases. The
question under the second prong is whether the condition that Congress places
on the funds simply coerces or actually compels the funding recipient to
engage in the unconstitutional action." 7 If the congressional funds merely
107 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (asserting that Congress's exercise of
its spending power must be in pursuit of "the general welfare").
10 Id. at 210-11.
109 Id. at 207.
110

Id. at 207-08.

"I Id. at 207.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
114

Id. at 208.

"

Id. at 210.

Id. at 210-11.
"I Id. at 211 (recognizing that there are times when congressional financial inducements
to states are so coercive that they are in fact compulsive).
116
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coerce, the spending legislation is permissible, as the Court has deemed the
violation to be a result of the funding recipient's own decision." 8 But when
Congress places conditions on federal funds that require the recipient to act in
a manner that violates the Constitution, the spending legislation is
unconstitutional. 119

These issues are often addressed when state actors attempt to defend
themselves against suits by private citizens.
When sued for some
constitutional violation, state actors sometimes argue that, although the
conditions on federal funds did not require their action, Congress authorized
their unconstitutional action.120 The Court has rejected this notion, indicating
that Congress has no power to authorize states to engage in unconstitutional
action. 121 In these cases, the Court has not necessarily invalidated the
congressional spending, but more narrowly held that the underlying state
activity is unconstitutional and Congress's implicit approval of it is
irrelevant.122 Because Congress did not require the unconstitutional action, the
state could have spent the federal funds in a way that did not violate the
Constitution. This is distinct from instances where Congress effectively
requires the unconstitutional action. In the latter situation, it would be
Congress that has acted unconstitutionally.123 In the former, the state acted
unconstitutionally and Congress cannot turn unconstitutional action into
constitutional action.124 In related cases, the Court has also held that Congress
is prohibited from enlisting state cooperation in a joint federal-state program
that would violate the Constitution.125
Nonetheless, the purpose of this Article is not to validate a private cause of
action to challenge Congress's equal protection enforcement. The purpose is
to establish that Congress has a duty to further equal protection. That
individuals may not always be able to force Congress to fulfill this duty,
however, does not negate the existence of its duty, nor does it suggest that
Congress is free to take its duty lightly. Congress always has a duty to act in
accordance with and to carry out the Constitution.
118 Id.
119 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203, 214 (2003) (finding that
Congress, through passage of the Children's Internet Protection Act, did not induce libraries
to violate the First Amendment); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991).
120 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506-08 (1999); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 380-83 (1971).
2I See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) ("Congress may not
authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.").
122 The Court in Saenz, however, indicated that "Congress ...
is implicitly prohibited
from passing legislation that purports to validate [unconstitutional action]." Saenz, 526 U.S.
at 508.

" Shapiro,394 U.S. at 641.

124 See, e.g., Graham,403 U.S. at 380-83.
125Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971) (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641).
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EQUAL PROTECTION FAILURES AND VIOLATIONS IN TITLE I

Congress currently spends fifteen billion dollars per year on primary and
secondary schools. 126 The purpose of these funds is to supplement the local
money available to meet the special needs of poor children and also to obligate
schools to comply with various non-discrimination and equality statutes.127
The primary legislation through which Congress allocates these funds is Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.128 Because the Act is merely
spending legislation, Congress must reauthorize the Act periodically,
captioning it with a different title each time. The most recent version of the
Unfortunately, these
Act was the No Child Left Behind Act.129
reauthorizations have caused Title I to undergo various changes over the past
decades, some of which have diluted the impact of its funds and reduced the
requirement for equity between schools.
The initial version of Title I was narrowly focused on a relatively small
group of schools and students,130 but over time its funds have been spread
across a majority of the nation's schools.131 As a result, the funds' impact on
individual schools and students is far less significant.132 In addition, these
funds are now distributed in ways that actually exacerbate inequalities among
Likewise, although Congress imposed certain
many school districts.
conditions on these funds early in Title I's history, today these conditions do
126 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 1, app. (Summary of Discretionary Funds, Fiscal
Years 2008-2010).
127 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006) (listing "meeting the educational needs of low-achieving
children in our Nation's highest-poverty schools, limited English proficient children,
migratory children, children with disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent
children, and young children in need of reading assistance" as one of the statute's goals).
128 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
129 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
130 JEFFREY, supra note 2, at 60-61.
131 INsT. OF EDUC. SCIs., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS FROM THE COMMON CORE OF DATA:

SCHOOL YEAR

2006-07

tbl.2

[hereinafter

NUMBERS

AND

TYPES],

available at

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009304.pdf (indicating that 58,021 of the nation's total 98,793
schools are Title I schools).
132 The Office of Education saw this problem coming long before it finally came to
fruition. In 1969, the Office of Education concluded that, although Title I funds had
produced significant new resources and opportunities for poor children, these programs
could not be sustained over the long term given current trends. OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, HISTORY OF TITLE I ESEA 35 (1969) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF TITLE I] ("The trend . . . has been to serve more and more children but with less
[I]t will not be possible to enhance or even to maintain the quality of
and less money ....

local Title I programs unless those programs are concentrated more effectively on the most
educationally deprived children.").
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little if anything to address inequity. The original intent of many of the
conditions was to ensure that the funds were actually providing additional
resources to needy students and that the schools receiving these funds were
equivalent to other schools. But these conditions have been relaxed and
amended in ways that actually allow inequity rather than constrain it.
The relaxation of equity standards and the inequitable distribution of federal
funds raise constitutional concerns. Ignoring or sanctioning certain inequities
might be rational if supplemental federal funds remedied the inequities, but
they do not. In fairness to Congress, because states and local school districts
are the ones that create the inequities in the first instance and Congress does
not mandate these inequities, the current structure of Title I may not amount to
a denial of equal protection itself. However, insofar as Congress sanctions or
permits these known inequities, Congress breaches its duty under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce equal protection. Congress then
compounds its breach of duty by not only sanctioning these inequities, but
expanding them through the way in which it distributes Title I funds.
Of course, the mere existence of inequities in schools does not necessarily
amount to a violation of equal protection that Congress must address, but as
demonstrated in a recent article, many of the inequities that states create do
violate equal protection.133 All fifty states have constitutional clauses that
guarantee students a public education,134 and many state courts have held that
this constitutional right to education includes a qualitative component. 135 The
various state legislatures have also enacted statutes that further expand and
define the meaning of this right.136 When the United States Supreme Court
first addressed funding inequities in San Antonio Independent School District

v. Rodriguez,137 educational rights had not yet developed into qualitative and
constitutional rights. Rather, education was akin to a basic public benefit that
the state could distribute whimsically amongst its citizens. In contrast, today
the right to education is an affirmative state constitutional right and would
require a more stringent equal protection scrutiny than what the Court
previously applied.138 Thus, when educational inequities rise to the level of
violating their respective state constitutions and statutes, they are often also
denials of equal protection under Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 39

133 Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 5).
134 Hubsch, supra note 18, at 96-97.

135 Rebell, supra note 19, at 1502.
116 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-1 to -583 (2007 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE. ANN. §
22.1-253.13:1 (Supp. 2009).
137 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973) (refusing to recognize any requirements beyond providing
children with "the opportunity to acquire . .. basic minimal skills").
138 Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 5).

139 Id.
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Based on Part I's discussion of Congress's power and responsibility under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, one might argue that Congress
could, in a good faith exercise of discretion, choose not to act to remedy these
inequities. In effect, Congress might conclude that no legislation is appropriate
at this time, or until the federal courts further address these issues. However,
once Congress chooses to act in this field, its power is limited to those actions
that are consistent with enforcing equal protection. More particularly,
although Congress might refrain from acting, it is unconstitutional for
Congress to enact legislation that is antithetical to equal protection in
education. When Congress sanctions, funds, and sometimes exacerbates
denials of equal protection by the states, it does exactly that: it directly
undermines, rather than enforces, equal protection.
A.

The History and Purposeof Title I

That a program whose original purpose is to provide additional funding to
poor children would violate the Constitution seems counterintuitive,
particularly given that Congress's duty to enforce equal protection is relatively
broad and includes a level of discretion. Were Congress to have maintained
the structure and substance of the earlier iterations of Title I, this Article would
concede that Congress appropriately furthers equal protection through Title I.
The current version of Title I, however, is significantly different from earlier
versions in some of the most important areas, and its interest in assisting poor
children and remedying inequity is no longer clear. Rather, its purposes have
strayed more towards general educational reform at best, and simple
entitlement funding at worst. Although improving education generally is a
laudable goal, that goal cannot come at the expense of, or be indifferent to,
equal protection.
Significant federal funding for primary and secondary schools did not begin
until 1965, when Congress first enacted the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act.140 Extending federal funds to public schools served two
purposes: furthering the War on Poverty and desegregating schools with a
carrot rather than a stick.141 The money was not directed to all schools, but
rather to schools serving a specific group of children: poor children living in
areas of concentrated poverty.1 42 By accepting federal funds, the schools
became subject to various conditions embodied in federal statutes. Most
important among these conditions was compliance with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination in federally funded

140 JEFFREY, supra note 2, at 89.
141Julia Hanna, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act 40 Years Later, ED.

Summer 2005, available at http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/2005/
0819_esea.html.
142 See HISTORY OF TITLE I, supra note 132, at 17; Goodwin Liu, Improving Title I
Funding Equity Across States, Districtsand Schools, 93 IOWA L. REv. 973, 975 (2008).
MAGAZINE,
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programs and directed federal agencies to implement regulations to further
enforce Title VI.143
Of course, school districts were already subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Supreme Court's prohibition of school segregation in
Brown v. Board of Education.144 The Supreme Court's decision, however,

accomplished very little by itself. A decade after Brown, desegregation had
not even begun in most school districts. 145 The hope was that by extending
federal dollars to school districts and attaching conditions to those funds,
federal agencies could desegregate schools more effectively and consistently
than could federal courts alone. 146 In fact, once financial consequences
attached to desegregation, many schools finally began to implement Brown's
requirements in earnest. 147 The results, however, were far from uniform.
Although desegregating, some school districts spent the funds in less than
responsible ways. In particular, some states simply used federal dollars to
replace state dollars. 148 The obvious result was to undermine Congress's other
purpose of providing extra resources for the education of low-income students.
In response, Congress imposed additional conditions and restrictions to
ensure that school districts used the funds to improve educational services for
poor students. In particular, Congress conditioned the receipt of Title I funds
on the concepts of comparability and supplemental funding. 149 Comparability
required that the state and local funding at Title I schools be comparable to that
at non-Title I schools. 5 0 Thus, a school district would violate Title I if it spent
$2000 per pupil at a non-Title I school while only spending $1500 per student

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
1 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

143

145 GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEi LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., BROWN

50: KING's DREAM OR PLESSY's NIGHTMARE? 19 (2004),
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/researchl/reseg04/brown5O.pdf.
AT

available at

See ORFIELD, supra note 3, at 46, 77.
147 Id. at 77. But see Vincent James Strickler, Green-Lighting Brown: A Cumulative146

Process Conception of Judicial Impact, 43 GA. L. REV. 785, 854-55 (2009) (finding that
neither the courts, nor federal funding, produced much desegregation in their early stages).
148 Phyllis McClure, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, The History of Educational Comparability
in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in ENSURING EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: How LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT FUNDING PRACTICES
HURT DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY CAN Do ABOUT IT 9, 13

(2008)

[hereinafter

ENSURING

EQUAL

OPPORTUNITY],

available

at

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/06/pdf/comparability.pdf; see also HISTORY
OF TITLE I, supra note 132, at 23-25 (discussing the lack of real reporting and monitoring of
the funds during the first few years following the Elementary and Education Act's
enactment).
149 Pub. L. No. 91-230, sec. 105(a)(3), § 109, 84 Stat. 121, 124 (1970).
150 Id.
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at a Title I school. 5 1 In effect, school districts that did not treat their schools
equally would not be eligible for additional Title I dollars to make up the
difference of the inequality. The concept of supplemental funding required
that school districts use federal dollars to supplement those funds that they
were already spending, rather than using federal dollars to supplant existing
state or local funds.152 In short, states could not reduce their own spending on
schools in a single year or over time and replace it with federal dollars.
This early version of Title I, both in design and function, is a quintessential
example of Congress carrying out its duty to enforce equal protection. First, to
the extent states were financially and qualitatively shortchanging poor students
and districts, Congress remedied inequality both by providing more funds for
poor students and prohibiting districts from treating them unequally. Prior to
Title I, states and local school districts paid little attention to providing special
services for at-risk, needy, or disabled children.153 For instance, many school
districts excluded disabled students altogether because they refused to incur the
cost of educating them.154 As for poor, at-risk, or needy students, the best
schools simply expected them to succeed with the same resources as the
general student population, with no additional attention given to their special
needs. More frequently, however, poor students were in schools where they
received substantially less resources than students at other schools. 55 Title I's
purpose was to end this disadvantageous treatment. Second, Congress used
funding and antidiscrimination statutes to achieve desegregation in ways the
courts could not.156 Likewise, Title I funds created the means by which to
implement other antidiscrimination norms in the future. Thus Title I, in

15 The specific requirement after the 1970 amendments to the ESEA were that school
expenditures at Title I schools be within five percent of non-Title I schools. McClure, supra
note 148, at 17-18. This specific requirement, however, was detailed in federal regulations
rather than the statute itself. Id. at 17.
152 Pub. L. No. 91-230, sec. 105(a)(3), § 109, 84 Stat. 121, 124.
153 See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972)
(adjudicating the District of Columbia's refusal to provide education to special needs
students).
154 Id.; see also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94142, §§ 3(b)(3), 601, 89 Stat. 773, 774 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006))
("[M]ore than half of the handicapped children in the United States do not receive
appropriate educational services which would enable them to have full equality of
opportunity.").
151 McClure, supra note 148, at 14 (indicating that many of the schools receiving Title I
funds were black schools that had been the victims of unequal funding under de jure

segregation); see also WAYNE FLYNT, ALABAMA INTHE TWENTIETH CENTURY 223-25 (Glenn

Feldman & Kari Frederickson eds., 2004) (discussing the historical absence of high schools
for blacks in Alabama and the drastically unequal spending in other respects).
156 See ORFIELD, supra note 3, at 46 (considering that the strategy of withholding federal
aid was Congress's response to the lack of progress made by the civil rights movement in
the judicial system).
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conjunction with other statutes, was a remedy to past, present, and future
discriminatory violations of equal protection.
Unfortunately, this initial mission to secure educational equality has been
diluted, lost, and undermined. The first major redirections of Title I occurred
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Congress altered the standards that
ensured equity among schools for a decade of Title I's history.15 7 Most
important among these changes were those to Title I's comparability
requirements. As indicated above, comparability standards were designed to
ensure that the state and local funds available for Title I schools were
equivalent to those at non-Title I schools. Title I and its regulations originally
permitted no more than a five percent variance in spending between Title I and
non-Title I schools.158 In the late 1970s, the regulations loosened this
requirement, doubling the permissible variance to ten percent and thereby
permitting the gap between disadvantaged schools and privileged schools to
expand.159 During the Reagan Administration, quantifiable measures of
comparability were simply eliminated altogether. 160
Title I's role in furthering equal protection through anti-discrimination
policies, particularly in regard to segregation, has likewise shifted. This shift,
unlike that of comparability, has occurred over time rather than in a single
reauthorization of the statute. This shift, nonetheless, is nearly complete.
Federal regulatory efforts to desegregate have been slowly curtailed for
decades. 161 Yet, the long curtailment has accumulated to the point where
active desegregation is almost entirely non-existent today.162 Thus, the

1s7 See Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §
558(c)(2), 95 Stat. 357, 468 (permitting districts to demonstrate comparability with a mere

district wide salary schedule, and the existence of policies of equivalence for instruction and
curriculum).
158 45 C.F.R. § 116.26 (1972) (requiring comparability at a five percent variance between
Title I and non-Title I schools); 45 C.F.R. § 116a.26 (1977) (requiring the same five percent
comparability between Title I and non-Title I schools); see also McClure, supra note 148, at
17.
'1' 45 C.F.R. § 116 (1978) (making no reference to numerical comparability at all); see
also McClure, supra note 148, at 18.
160 McClure, supra note 148, at 21; see also Education Consolidation and
Improvement
Act of 1981 § 558(c)(2), 85 Stat. at 468.
161 U.S.

COMM'N

DESEGREGATION,

ON

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

BECOMING

LESS

SEPARATE?

SCHOOL

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ENFORCEMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF UNITARY

22-23
(2007),
available
at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
092707.BecomingLessSeparateReport.pdf (discussing Department of Justice data that
shows the United States was a party to roughly half as many desegregation lawsuits in 2007
as in 1984).
162 Id. at 25 ("Since [fiscal year] 1991, [the Educational Opportunities Section ("EOS")
of the Department of Justice] has not initiated any new traditional desegregation lawsuits
and has indicated that they are not aware of any such federal suits being instituted by other
STATUS
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funding structure that was initiated to desegregate schools can no longer be
characterized as a concerted effort to ensure racial equity in education. Of
course, Congress still requires schools that receive federal funds to comply
with Title VI's prohibition on racial discrimination,16 3 but this prohibition is
largely redundant today. In contrast to prior yearsI6 courts no longer interpret
Title VI as placing any higher burden on schools than does the Constitution,165
and the Department of Education no longer seeks to enforce high standards of
equality vigorously through its regulatory power. 166 Instead of using these
funds to desegregate schools or ensure racial equity, Congress now uses these
funds to further its general educational reform efforts, such as improving
general educational quality or encouraging standards-based teaching and
testing.167 While such ends may have independent merit, goals of this sort do
not amount to remedial action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, they
are simply policy initiatives.1 68 In short, Title I no longer serves as a
mechanism of equal protection enforcement.
B.

The Deconcentrationand Limited Impact of Title I Funds

Like the overall mission of Title I, the disbursement of Title I funds has also
shifted over time, undermining its very ability, regardless of intent, to serve as
a remedial tool. Congress initially directed Title I funds primarily to areas of

parties. Moreover, EOS has not intervened in any ongoing desegregation lawsuits during
this time period.").
163 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
'" See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1999); N.Y. Urban League,
Inc., v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric.,
998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. City of Yonkers, No. 80 Civ. 6761,
1995 WL 358746, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1995).
165 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001) (holding that a cause of
action under Title VI exists only for intentional discrimination).
166 The Department of Education maintains a disparate impact regulation. 34 C.F.R. §
100.3(b)(2) (2008). But the enforcement of that regulation is not mentioned in any respect
in the Office for Civil Rights's most recent report to Congress. 2007-2008 OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS

ANN.

REP.,

available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annuallocr/

annrpt2007-08/annrpt2007-08.pdf.
167 U.S. Dep't of Educ., Four Pillars of NCLB, supra note 6 (discussing the four pillars
of No Child Left Behind and its exclusion of the traditional mission of equity for poor
children or racial minorities); see also Liu, supra note 142, at 975 (highlighting that original
education legislation intended to direct "federal aid to poor children living in concentrated
poverty," not provide for general education reform); McClure, supra note 148, at 23
(pronouncing that Title I no longer focuses on servicing disadvantaged students in poor
areas).
16s In all fairness, the Act does require schools to report student achievement by race and
ensure students in all subgroups are achieving sufficiently. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2006).
However, this goal is but a portion of the Act and its overall attempt to reform schools.
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concentrated poverty and racial segregation.169 Thus, to create maximum
incentives for desegregation and significantly increase the resources in the
neediest schools, a relatively small number of schools received Title I funds. 170
Congress, however, no longer appropriately focuses its funding on these
schools. The lack of focus may actually have little impact on desegregation
because the will to further serious desegregation is missing even if funds were
available.' 7' However, the lack of focus does have a large impact on the
capacity of Title I to improve educational opportunities for poor students and
schools because the funds are now diluted across so many schools.
Today, over ninety percent of school districts receive Title I funds.1 72 The
threshold for eligibility is the existence of a mere two percent of a school
district's children living below the poverty level.' 7 3 With this low threshold,
fifty-eight percent of public schools receive Title I funds.174 Thus, the
available funds are diluted across a wide cross-section of schools, but not all of
these schools are predominantly poor schools.' 75 The effect is to take needed
funds away from the poorest schools and give it to schools that have relatively
small numbers of poor students.
By deconcentrating Title I funds, the per-pupil allotment drops to a level
that makes it difficult for federal funds to make an appreciable difference in the
educational opportunities that poor children receive.176 Experts estimate that
169 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 201, 79 Stat.
27, 27 (indicating the purpose and policy was to fund school districts "serving areas with
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their
educational programs").
170 Id. § 205(a)(1), 79 Stat. at 30 (limiting grants under the statute to those areas of
concentrated poverty with school programs that were of "sufficient size, scope, and quality
to give reasonable promise of substantial progress toward meeting" the needs of poor
children); HISTORY OF TITLE I, supra note 132, at 5-6.
171See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Court's Role, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1597, 1599-1600 (2003) (discussing the
failures of past administrations, courts, and political will to desegregate schools).
172 C. Joy Farmer, Note, The No Child Left Behind Act: Will it Produce a New Breed of
School Financing Litigation?,38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443, 456 (2005).
1 34 C.F.R. § 200.71 (2008).

174 NUMBERS AND TYPES, supra note 131, (indicating that 58,021 of the nation's total

98,793 schools are Title I schools).
"I James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 932, 942 (2004) (explaining how the eligibility standards can result in high-poverty
schools in some school districts not receiving funds, while lower poverty schools in other
districts would receive funds).
176 HISTORY OF TITLE I, supra note 132, at 35 ("[The trend] has been to serve more and
more children but with less and less money. . . . [I]t will not be possible to enhance or even
to maintain the quality of local Title I programs unless those programs are concentrated
more effectively on the most educationally deprived children."); Ryan, supra note 175, at
942; Farmer, supra note 172, at 456.
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special needs students require thirty to sixty percent more funding than the
general student.177 Congress and the Department of Education have estimated
the additional need at forty percent. 78 The total federal allotment for public
schools, however, is modest, making up less than ten percent of school budgets
nationally.179 After spreading the funds across so many schools, they fall far
short of a thirty to sixty percent supplement. For instance, in Arkansas where
the state spent $5929 per pupil in 2006, the Title I supplement was $1009 per
poor student, a mere seventeen percent increase in funding. 80 The percentage
is even lower in states like South Carolina and Nevada.' 8' However, the
dilution of funds can be even greater at the individual school level. Because of
the various weights built into the funding formulas, the poorest schools are
forced to stretch their Title I dollars further than wealthier schools. As Liu
notes, the average Title I aid per student in schools that have low levels of poor
students is $773, while that number is only $475 in schools with the highest
levels of poor students.182 Thus, not only are Title I funds diluted as a general
matter, they are the lowest in the schools where they are needed the most.
1n No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, §§ 1124, 1125A, 115 Stat. 1425,
1516, 1525-26 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333, 6337 (2006)) (setting the standard for
whether low-income schools are fairly funded as whether they receive a forty percent
funding increase adjustment); NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICs, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
INEQUALITIES INPUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES 62 (1998) (identifying forty percent as
the appropriate adjustment for low-income students); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SCHOOL FINANCE: PER PUPIL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SELECTED INNER CITY AND SUBURBAN
SCHOOLS VARIED BY METROPOLITAN AREA 30 (2002); Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, THE

EDUCATION TRUST, How States Shortchange the Districts That Need the Most Help, in
FUNDING GAPS 2006, supra note 12, at 5, 6 (stating that Goodwin Liu uses a sixty percent
adjustment for poor children, while authors Wiener and Pristoop use a forty percent
adjustment); see also THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY &
ANTIQUITY
IN
SCHOOL
FINANCE
21-30
(2006),
available
at

http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/FundtheChild062706.pdf (advocating student weighting
funding that would drive additional resources to needy children).
178 Education Finance Incentive Grant Program, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1125(A), 115
Stat. 1425, 1525 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6337) (setting the standard for whether lowincome schools are fairly funded as whether they receive a forty percent funding increase
adjustment); NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 177, at 62 (identifying forty
percent as the appropriate adjustment for low-income students); see also U.S. GEN.

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 177, at 30 (using forty percent as a mark of low income).
179 THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 14 app. tbl.8.

1so Id. at 3 tbl.1, 4 tbl.2.
'I For instance, the percentage falls to sixteen in South Carolina and fourteen in Nevada.
Id. The calculations are based on data in the source, which lists $6746 in South Carolina

state expenses per pupil and $1140 as Title I allocation, and $6362 in Nevada state expenses
per pupil and $897 as Title I allocation. Id.
'8 Liu, supra note 142, at 1010 (citing STEPHANIE STULLICH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFEDUC.,
TARGETING SCHOOLS: STUDY OF TITLE I ALLOCATIONS WITHIN SCHOOL DISTRICTS 10

(1999)).
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Of course, were states themselves already providing a large portion of the
necessary supplement, the modest federal allotment would be sufficient.
However, this is not the case. Relying on the federal standard of a forty
percent increase, a recent study finds that even with federal dollars, students
who attend schools with high levels of poor students are shortchanged by
$1307 per pupil on average.183 Of course, some states are below that average
and, thus, Title I funds come close to meeting student needs, but other states
like New York shortchange poor students at an astounding rate of $2927 per
pupil.184 Thus, in an average elementary school of four hundred students, New
York would be shortchanging the school by approximately one million dollars.
Of course, the states themselves are primarily responsible for these
shortcomings,' 8 but if Congress's aim is to remedy these problems, its dilution
of funds across ninety percent of the nation's school districts currently stands
in the way.
C.

The IrrationalDistributionof Title I Funds

As the above discussion implies, not only does Congress overly dilute Title I
funds, it distributes them in various irrational ways that undermine the ability
of Title I to remedy inequities. Goodwin Liu finds that, rather than directing
resources to the neediest students and remedying inequality, the current
funding formulas serve political ends and administrative convenience. 186 In
the absence of a duty to enforce equal protection, Congress might be free to
pursue political ends, but given the continuing prevalence of inequitable
educational opportunities, Congress has no such luxury. Moreover, as the
following demonstrates, not only is Congress shirking its Fourteenth
Amendment duty, it is directly funding inequality and oftentimes increasing it.
Congress distributes Title I funds through no less than four different funding
formulas and grants. 87 Two of the current formulas are simply remnants of

183 THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12,
'
Id.

at 7 tbl.3.

'8 See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."); R.I. CONsT. art.
XII, § I ("The diffusion of knowledge . . . being essential to the preservation of [the
people's] rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of the general [state] assembly to promote
public schools . . . , and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education . . . .").
186Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.

2044, 2064-66 (2006).
18720 U.S.C. § 6333 (2006) (setting forth amounts of Basic Grants to local
agencies); § 6334 (setting forth amounts of Concentration Grants to local
agencies); § 6335 (setting forth amounts of Targeted Grants to local educational
6337 (appropriating funds for Education Finance Incentive Grants to local
agencies).
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prior versions of Title 1I.88 Rather than revising the old formulas, Congress
added new formulas in 1994.189 The failure to coordinate and evaluate these
different formulas creates irrational fund distributions and also the potential for
the formulas to work at cross-purposes. The first flaw in the formulas is that
they all include statutory minimums that provide a base level of funding to all
states, regardless of their need, poverty, or other relevant factors.190 As a
result, states with small populations, such as South Dakota or Rhode Island,
receive a disproportionately large amount of money that bears no relation to
the number of poor students they serve.19 1 In fact, because they have so few
poor students, their Title I funding per student exceeds the amount that twothirds of the other states receive. 19 2 The windfall for students in these states
serves no rational purpose. Instead, it is likely more directly related to gaining
or keeping the support of Senators in those states for Title I in general.

The second flaw in Title I is that its funding formulas do not fully account
for the negative effects of concentrated poverty. Research on the issue
uniformly indicates that as the concentration of poverty increases, the negative
educational effects of poverty are compounded.193 Thus, it would cost more
per pupil to counteract the disadvantage of poverty in a school that is fifty
percent low-income than it would in a school that is fifteen percent lowincome. Two of Title I's funding formulas explicitly recognize this principle,
but do not fully account for it.194 These two formulas actually exponentially
increase the per-pupil expenditure as the percentage of poor students in a
district increases, but stop the exponential increase at roughly thirty percent
(twenty-nine percent poverty if measured at the county level and thirty-eight
percent if measured at the school district level).1 95 Thus, while the formulas
recognize that it costs more per pupil to educate poor students in a school with
thirty percent poverty than, for instance, a school with twenty percent poverty,
it treats all students above the thirty percent poverty level as equivalent to one
another. Flattening the funding increase at thirty percent poverty is facially
"I See Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 101, 108 Stat.
3518, 3519 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301); id. § 1125, 108 Stat. at 3571 (codified at 20
U.S.C. §6335).
89 Id. § 1 125A, 108 Stat. at 3575 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6336) (adding Targeted Grants
and Education Finance Incentive Grants to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act).
190 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333(d), 6334(b), 6335(e), 6337(b)(1)(B).
'9' THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 3 tbl. 1.
192 Id.

193 See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 20-23; KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now,
supra note 30, at 39-40; McUsic, supra note 30, at 1355; see also GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN
E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF

EDUCATIoN 53 (1996) (indicating that research has consistently found a "powerful
relationship between concentrated poverty and virtually every measure of school-level
academic results").
194 20 U.S.C. §§ 6335(c)(1)(B), 6335(c)(2)(B), 6337(d)(1)(A), 6337(d)(1)(B).
195 Id.
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irrational, as the effects of poverty do not flatten at thirty percent. In fact, the
need for exponentially greater funding based on concentrated poverty likely
starts, rather than ends, somewhere between thirty and fifty percent.196
Research on student achievement generally indicates that, so long as the
percentage of students in poverty remains below fifty percent, the overall
achievement of the student body can remain steady. 197 But once poverty
approaches fifty percent, the effects become deleterious for both poor and
middle-class students.198 The funding formulas seemingly acknowledge this
research, but nonetheless act contrary to it by limiting the increase for
concentrated poverty at the arbitrary level of thirty percent.' 99 The practical
196See KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now, supra note 30, at 39-40 (explaining that

researchers have defined high-poverty as the point where fifty percent of students or more
are eligible for free or reduced-price meals because students in these schools have far lower
test scores than similar students in schools with lesser concentrations of poor students);
MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC.,

PROSPECTS: THE CONGRESSIONALLY

MANDATED STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY: THE INTERIM REPORT 77

tbl.1.51

(1993)

[hereinafter

THE

INTERIM

REPORT],

available

at

http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/datalericdocs2sql/content-storage_01/0000019b/80/13/1
0/cc.pdf (demonstrating a precipitous decline in student performance once the percentage of
poor students reaches fifty percent); MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES 12 (1997),
available at

http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/dataeriecdocs2sql/content storage_01/0000019b/80/15/0
ale8.pdf ("School poverty depresses the scores of all students in schools where at least half
of the students are eligible for subsidized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when
over 75 percent of students live in low-income households.").
197KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now, supra note 30, at 39-40; THE INTERIM REPORT,

supra note 196, at 77 tbl.1.51.
198KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now, supra note 30, at 39-40.

Consistent with this

research, Wake County, North Carolina caps the percentage of poor students assigned to a
single school at forty percent. KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY FOUND, supra note 30, at 4, 9-

11.
199The current weightings for concentrated poverty suggest a viewpoint that assumes
poverty is primarily an individual problem rather than a structural institutional problem.
The formulas allocate money to school districts (and consequently the schools within them)
even when they have very low levels of poor students. Such funding is consistent with an
individualized view of poverty, as individual students in schools with low levels of poverty
surely have individual needs of their own. But if one views student poverty in education as
an institutional problem, allocating funds to schools with very low levels of poverty is
questionable. In all fairness, while the formulas recognize that student needs increase as the
poverty level approaches thirty percent, they still suggest an individualized concept of
poverty whereby the individual needs of students peak regardless of the school they attend.
Thus, even if an entire school is poor, each student's need is equivalent to the needs of
students in a school with lesser poverty. Schools, however, do not deliver education to
individuals or in a vacuum. They deliver education to communities or groups of students
and within the context that those groups create. Thus, although individual poor students
certainly have individual needs even if the overall school has only a small number of poor
students, these students' poverty has essentially no effect on the school's ability to deliver
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effect is to deny the additional funds to the most disadvantaged students, those
for whom Title I was primarily designed to aid.
Interestingly, while Title I places insufficient weight on poverty
concentration, it inexplicably places significant weight on district size, creating
the third major flaw in the funding formulas. The funding formula for Title I's
Targeted Grants significantly increases the per-pupil funds as the size of the
school district increases.2 00 If school district size corresponded with
geographic location, this weighting might be rational, as the cost of education
tends to be higher in more densely populated states and localities. For
instance, the cost of education tends to be higher in cities than in rural areas. 20 1
However, school district size does not necessarily correspond with population
density or with city versus rural school districts. Rather, the size of a school
district is random in most respects.
Some cities and localities have metropolitan school districts while others are
divided up into multiple small school districts. For instance, Charlotte, North
Carolina has a single school district that includes both the city of Charlotte and
the county of Mecklenberg. 202 It serves over 133,000 students. 203 The total
population of the county is approximately one million and the entire
metropolitan area around 1.5 million. 204 In contrast, Detroit has a single city
school district that is surrounded by fifty-three suburban school districts. 20 5
The city school district serves just fewer than 90,000 students. 206 The total
metropolitan area is over four million. 207 In short, while Detroit is twice the
size of Charlotte, its school district is one-third smaller. Under the Title I
education. In contrast, when the percentage of poor students in a school is, for example,
fifty percent, these students have significant impacts on the ability of the school to deliver
education to all of its students, regardless of their individual socioeconomic class. In short,
although Title I attempts to address concentrated poverty, its approach does not fully
account for the effect that concentrated poverty has on educational institutions.
200 20 U.S.C. § 6335(c)(1)(b) (weighting the formula based on the total number of
children in a school district).
201 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 393-94 (N.J. 1990) (discussing
the unique administrative burdens that cities confront based on the various services they
must offer citizens outside of education); id. at 400-04 (discussing the special and additional
needs of poor students in urban districts).
202 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
203 Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools, http://www.cms.kl2.nc.us/mediaroom/aboutus/
Pages/FastFacts.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
204 Charlotte
Chamber,
http://www.charlottechamber.com/index.php?submenu=
DemographicsEconomicProfile&src=gendocs&ref=DemographicsEconomicProfile&catego
ry=eco-dev (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
205 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740
(1974).
206 Detroit Public Schools, http://www.detroitkl2.org (last visited Oct. 18,
2009).
207 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN

tbl.1 (2009),
available at http://www.census.gov/popest/metro/tables/2008/CBSA-EST2008-01.xls.
AND MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2008
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formula that relies on district size as a factor, however, Charlotte would
receive a larger per-pupil Title I grant than Detroit. 208
When looking at small districts, which could be located anywhere in the
country, the problem is even more obvious. Pelham Union Free School
District, which borders New York City School District and is one of the most
expensive and dense localities in the country, services just over 2500
students. 209 Alabama, in contrast, is one of the relatively least expensive areas
of the country to live and largely rural. However, out of Alabama's 132 school
districts, almost sixty percent are equal to or larger than Pelham. 210 Thus,
these Alabama districts would receive the same amount of funding, or greater,
per pupil as those in Pelham under the district size funding weights even
though Pelham is located in a far more expensive locality.
Notwithstanding the randomness of school district size, Title I places
significant weight on it. In fact, district size carries more weight than the
concentration of poverty. 2 11 Thus, a medium-sized school district with over
ninety percent poor students would be disadvantaged in relation to a larger
school district with a lower percentage of poor students. Goodwin Liu notes
that this heavy weighting for large school districts might be rational if these
large school districts happened to educate a majority of the nation's poor
children. 2 12 However, just as school district size does not correlate with cost or
geography, neither does it closely correlate with the number of poor children
that a district serves. 213 Poor children are spread throughout the country's
school districts. In fact, over half of the nation's poor children attend school
districts that are smaller than 50,000 students. 214 Thus, favoring large school
districts does not serve to direct additional funds to poor students. Instead, it
actually does them a disservice by creating arbitrary inequities.
By favoring large school districts, the formula creates an inequity between
rural and urban districts, even though the percentage of poor students in many
rural school districts is just as high as in urban districts. In some areas, rural
districts collectively may serve just as many poor students as urban districts.
20 U.S.C. § 6335(c)(1)(C) (2006) (providing a different funding weight for districts
above 93,811 students).
209 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMMON CORE OF DATA, LOCAL EDUCATION
AGENCY UNIVERSE SURVEY (2006-2007) (data on file with author) (listing Pelham Union
Free School District student population as 2681 in 2006-2007).
210 Id. (listing 54 out of 132 districts as having a student population lower than 2681 in
2006-2007).
211 Liu, supra note 142, at 991. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6335(c)(2)(C), with id. §
6335(c)(1)(C) (giving roughly the same weight in the funding formula to district size of
201

approximately 94,000 and to thirty percent poverty).
212 Liu, supra note 142, at 1003.
213 Id.
214 Id. (stating that within the school districts that as a whole enroll seventy-three percent

of the nation's poor children, "[s]ixty-two percent of ... poor children were enrolled in
districts with 50,000 or fewer students").
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Furthermore, the formula creates inequity between mid-sized and large school
districts, even though their costs and needs are often similar. Goodwin Liu
points to the example of Los Angeles Unified School District, one of the
nation's largest school districts, which is abutted by Inglewood and Kings
Canyon school districts. Although smaller in size, Inglewood and Kings
Canyon are urban districts with costs very similar to Los Angeles. 215
Inglewood and Kings County both have high proportions of poor students, but
because of the weighting for district size, Inglewood receives only sixty-three
cents, and Kings Canyon only fifty-four cents, for every dollar Los Angeles
receives. 216 In short, not only does Congress minimize the impact of Title I
funds by diluting them, those funds that it does distribute are irrationally
allocated based heavily on factors such as district size, rather than on the most
important factor: poverty concentration.
Title I's Exacerbationof Funding Inequalities

D.

Not only has Congress diluted the effectiveness of Title I funds in
remedying inequality, Congress creates or exacerbates additional inequality in
some respects. Most notably, rather than closing the resource gap between
states, Congress actually increases the gap or creates new ones. First, as noted
above, the funding formulas in Title I have minimum allotments for small
states, regardless of how few poor students they educate. 2 17 Consequently,
states with small populations receive a disproportionate share of Title I funds
and, thus, more funds per student. 218 In fact, states like Wyoming and
Vermont receive the highest per-pupil allotments of Title I funds in the country
at nearly $3000 per pupil, but have the fewest number of poor children in the
country. 219 Moreover, their state and local spending levels already rank among
the top four most well-funded in the country. 220 In short, in some instances,
the state minimums act to give the highest per-pupil allotments to the richest
states with the fewest poor students. The effect is not just irrational; it expands
the gap between these states and needier states.
Second, Congress further perpetuates funding discrepancies by basing the
amount of Title I funds on the amount the state itself spends on education. 221

Id. at 1000 tbl.5.
Id. at 1001.
217 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333(d), 6334(b), 6335(e), 6337(b)(1)(B) (2006); see also supra notes
190-91 and accompanying text.
218 Liu, supra note 142, at 981-82 (indicating that Alaska, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming receive relatively high amounts of aid even though they
have low levels of poverty).
215
216

219 THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 3 tbl.1.
220 Id. at 4 tbl.2.
221 20 U.S.C. § 6333(a)(1)(B) (basing grant amount on the "average per-pupil
expenditure in the State"); §§ 6334(a)(2)(B), § 6335(b)(1)(B), § 6337(b)(1)(A)(i). But see §
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Two apparent premises motivate this practice: that the state expenditures
reflect the varying cost of education among stateS222 and that basing Title I
funds on state expenditures will create an incentive for states to increase their
own expenditures. 223 Although well intentioned, both premises prove incorrect
in reality. The variances in state contributions to education do not closely
correlate with the varying geographic costs.224 Thus, some states are overcompensated and others are under-compensated in terms of their cost. In fact,
because of the disconnect between local costs and state expenditures, the
United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") has recommended
eliminating state expenditures as a weighting factor in Title I funding
formulas. 225 Nevertheless, if basing federal funds on state expenditures created
an incentive for states to increase their educational expenditures, this weight
might be warranted. Unfortunately, they create very little, if any, incentive
because federal funds are such a small part of education budgets. 226 As
Goodwin Liu points out, a state like Mississippi would have to increase its
funding by fifty-four million dollars to get a mere three million dollar increase
in Title I funds. 227 More simply, for every extra dollar that Mississippi might
spend on education, it would receive less than six cents from Title I.
Several commentators conclude that basing Title I grants on the amount that
states spend simply penalizes poor states. 228 Rather than rewarding effort, it
rewards wealth. 229 States that have lower per-pupil expenditures often are

6333(a)(1)(B) (establishing minimums and maximums for this per-pupil expenditure, which
would prevent over-punishing poor states or over-rewarding rich states).
222 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 33.
223 See Education Finance Incentive Grant Program, 20 U.S.C. § 6337.
224 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28, at 33 (explaining that factors other
than cost, such as the high incomes of taxpayers in some states and the increased willingness
of some states to spend on education, affect the amount of local expenditures on education).
225 Id.

226 U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., supra note 35 (indicating federal funds are only eight percent
of local education agency budgets); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 28,
at 25 (stating that not only do Title I funds fail to push states to spend on low-income
students, "the amount of money that could be provided through an incentive grant is not
likely to be sufficient to create changes in states' behaviors").
2" Liu, supra note 142, at 985.
221 Id.; see also Goodwin Liu, THE EDUCATION TRUST, How the Federal Government
Makes Rich States Richer, in FUNDING GAPS 2006, at 2, 2 [hereinafter Liu, THE EDUCATION
TRUST]; John Podesta & Cynthia Brown, CTR. FOR Am. PROGRESS, Introduction, in
ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 148, at 1, 3. But see Schoolfinancel0's Blog,

http://schoolfinancel0l.wordpress.com/page/2 (Nov. 27, 2009).
229 Liu, supra note 142, at 983-84; see also Liu, THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 228,

at 2.
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taxing themselves at higher levels than states that spend far more per pupil. 23 0
Most states with low per-pupil expenditures simply lack the capacity to raise
the amount of funds that the higher spending states raise. For instance,
Mississippi taxes itself at a rate that exceeds the national average, but because
its taxable resources are well below the national average, it only generates
funds that amount to seventy-seven percent of the national average. 231 Thus,
even if Title I provided a significantly larger amount of funds in the attempt to
create an incentive for states to increase their local expenditures, many poor
states like Mississippi still would be unable to take advantage of the incentive.
In contrast, some states that are already spending the most per pupil could
easily generate more funds because their current rate of taxation is relatively
low. 232 Although the current funding levels are insufficient to create this
incentive, the effect of tying Title I funding to state funding continues to
penalize poor states for being poor. Moreover, it does so even if a poor state
distributes its available funds among its school districts equitably while a highspending state distributes its largess unequally. 233
In all fairness, some of the states that spend the most on education also have
the hi hest costs and those that spend the least sometimes have the lowest
costs. 4 In addition, because the federal poverty threshold is a single national
standard that does not account for the varying cost of living between states, it
understates the amount of poverty in some richer states and overstates it in
235
some poor states.
If Title I moved entirely away from relying on state
expenditures without also correctly measuring poverty, it might simply work
new injustices by ignoring the high cost of educating students who are not
counted as poor, but as a practical matter are poor, in rich states. 236 Thus, the
foregoing inequities that the state expenditure factor creates are neither unique,
nor easily resolved. Rather, inequity is inherent in any method of distributing
Title I funds that is not based on actual cost, actual poverty, or actual funding
effort. The challenge is developing a metric that accurately reflects these
factors.

230 Liu, THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 228, at 2; Podesta & Brown, supra note 228,
at 3 (noting that the current formula "penalizes states with low-tax bases even if they tax
themselves relatively heavily for education").
231'THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 4 tbl.2.
232 Id. (listing several states, such as Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, and
Maryland, that tax below the national average for education and yet have higher state
revenue per student).
233 Liu, supra note 142, at 985.
234 See generally Schoolfinancel01 's Blog, supra note 228.
235 U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty: How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/povdef.html (indicating the poverty thresholds
do not vary geographically).
236 See Schoolfinancel0l's Blog, supra note 228.
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Finally, it is worth noting that by penalizing poor school districts, Congress
perpetuates the same type of intractable inequity that has been at the center of
constitutional litigation for decades. In fact, the system of disadvantage in
Texas in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez237 is
structurally the same as the one Title I facilitates. 238 The Court's decision in
Rodriguez was the first major federal challenge to funding inequities. Texas
placed the overwhelming burden of educational funding on local school
districts. The poor school districts taxed themselves at high levels, but still
could not generate adequate educational funds. 239 In fact, if the poor school
districts raised their tax rate any further, they likely would have generated even
fewer total revenues, as a higher rate would have discouraged ownership and
development in those communities. 240 In contrast, Alamo Heights, a district
with far more wealth, taxed local property at a low rate but generated nearly
twice as many funds as the poorer districts. 241 Although the Court refused to
intervene because it held that education was not a fundamental right under the
Federal Constitution, 242 the existence of the inequity was not in dispute and
later became the basis for successful lawsuits arising under the Texas
Constitution. 243 States with similar inequities have also followed suit under
their own state constitutions. 244
The point here is that, by penalizing poor states, Congress operates a
funding system that is not entirely dissimilar from the ones that state supreme
courts have struck down as unconstitutional under state law when perpetrated
by the state. While Texas created inequity by forcing districts to fend for
themselves, Congress assumes that all states can fend for themselves. At both
the district and state level, some educational agencies simply lack the resources
to fend for themselves or take advantage of the incentives that the system
purports to offer. Of course, the basic constitutional responsibility for
education rests with the states, not Congress, but as a practical matter,
Congress's system is even more pernicious than the one in Texas in some
respects. Congress increases the inequity that already exists between some
1 (1973).
Id. at 9-10 (describing Texas school funding system in which the state funds each
school district in proportion to its local tax contributions).
239 Id. at 12-13 (indicating that the Edgewood District taxed itself at a rate of $1.05 per
$100 of property wealth, while Alamo Heights, which taxed itself at only $.85 per $100 of
property wealth, raised almost twice as much money per pupil as Edgewood).
240 See id. at 73-74, 128-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 12-13 (majority opinion).
237 411 U.S.
238

242 Id. at 35.
243

See, e.g., Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 797

(Tex. 2005); Carrollton Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood Ill), 826 S.W.2d 489, 503 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
(Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
(Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989).
24 See Rebell, supra note 19, at 1526-29.
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wealthy and poor states by providing the largest supplemental funds to the
richest states. Texas, at least, attempted to abate some of the funding
inequities that relying on local tax contributions created by supplementing the
poorest districts with some funds from the richer districts.2 45 Congress does no
such thing. In this respect, Congress's actions are, at best, irrational and, at
worst, a direct facilitator of inequality.
E.

Counterproductive Equity Standards

During Title I's early years, Congress was acutely concerned that states and
local school districts might use federal funds in ways that exacerbated
inequities between schools. Both to prevent new inequalities and to encourage
the elimination of existing inequalities, Congress imposed two major
conditions on the receipt of Title I funds. First, school districts could not use
federal funds to supplant local funds. Second, the resources offered at Title I
schools had to be comparable to the resources at other schools in the district.
Both of these conditions initially included strict compliance measures and
operated as serious attempts to ensure equality, but Congress has relaxed each
of these conditions in subsequent reauthorizations of Title I. In fact, these
conditions have been relaxed so much that they are, at best, meaningless and at
worst, an excuse or sanction for school districts to maintain rather than
eliminate existing inequity.
1. The Prohibition on Supplanting Local Dollars
The prohibition on supplanting local dollars requires that school districts use
federal dollars only to supplement local funds. 246 The point is to ensure that
Title I funds actually raise the total amount of resources available for lowincome students. Without a prohibition on supplanting funds, school districts
could simply fund a larger portion of their budget from federal resources and a
smaller portion from local resources, leaving the total combined expenditure
for schools flat. Toward this end, Title I requires that school districts maintain
their fiscal effort from one year to the next. 247 The standard attempts to project
what the local contribution for education should be in a given year and
determine whether that contribution is ever drawn down and inappropriately
supplanted with federal dollars.
Although well meaning, the prohibition on supplanting has not met its goal.
In fact, in a recent report, the GAO recommended eliminating the supplementnot-supplant standard altogether. 248 The GAO concluded that the standard has
245 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 7-10 (discussing the state fund that provides supplemental
resources to poor districts).
246 20 U.S.C. § 6321(b)(1) (2006).
247 Id. §§ 6321(a), 7901.
248 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS: FISCAL OVERSIGHT OF

TITLE I

COULD

BE

IMPROVED

24-26

(2003),

available at

new.items/d03377.pdf.
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become almost impossible to enforce. 249 Enforcing the standard requires too
much speculation about what a school district would have spent on education
and also requires extremely detailed tracking of spending in thousands of
school districts. 250 In short, the prohibition on supplanting funds relies on
unreliable projections and unusually labor-intensive work. Possibly for these
reasons, the Department of Education has effectively stopped attempting to
enforce the standard, treating it as a non-priority. 25' The standard, however,
remains the law and a measure that well-intentioned schools may expend effort
attempting to meet.
Ensuring that federal dollars actually add to state educational budgets rather
than replace existing funds can be achieved more easily through the
maintenance-of-effort standard. 252 Congress, however, has failed to utilize this
more effective measure. Instead, Congress has maintained a relatively loose
maintenance-of-effort standard that provides no real check on school budgets.
The current maintenance-of-effort standard only requires that school districts
maintain their funding at ninety percent of the previous year, 253 and further
allows districts to petition for a waiver of this standard. 254 The number of
school districts that have requested a waiver is so small that it demonstrates
how little the ninety percent standard requires of districts. Between 1995 and
2003, only twenty-five school districts out of the nation's fourteen thousand
requested a waiver. 255 In addition, the ninety percent standard provides enough
flexibility to theoretically permit schools to draw down their spending from
year to year and replace it with federal dollars, the very thing it is supposed to
prevent. Since school districts can reduce their local funding by ten percent in
a single year, and the federal government provides less than ten percent of
educational funds, a school could swap its own funds for federal funds without
violating the maintenance-of-effort requirement.256 Of course, the prohibition
on supplanting local funds is supposed to prevent this, but as indicated above,
identifying supplanted funds is very difficult, particularly if a school district
drew down its funds over a period of years rather than in just one year.
Id. at 25.
250 See id. at 19-20 (indicating that the standard actually confuses those responsible for
monitoring and following it).
251 Id. at 20-21.
252 Id. at 24-25 ("[E]nsuring compliance with [a maintenance of effort] provision
presents few challenges and requires few additional audit resources.").
253 Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 6321(a), 7901 (2006), with 45 C.F.R. § 116.19 (1977)
(requiring schools to maintain their fiscal effort within five percent of the preceding year).
254 Id. § 7901(c) (stating that requirements of this section may be waived due to
"exceptional or uncontrollable circumstances" or "a precipitous decline in the financial
resources of the local educational agency").
255 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 248, at 10 n.8; School Data Direct,
http://www.schooldatadirect.orglapp/location/q/stid=1036196/llid=162/stllid=676/locid=103
6195/site=pes (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
256 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
249
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Moreover, the prohibition on supplanting funds is not fully enforced. Thus, the
maintenance-of-effort standard, although a potentially effective measure,
currently provides so much flexibility that it permits the very evils it is meant
to prevent.
The number of school districts or state legislatures that consciously take
advantage of this flexibility is hopefully small in number, but that some do
gradually draw down local funds or simply fail to maintain their own fair share
is almost certain. School finance cases have demonstrated that the educational
funding is inadequate in many school districts, 257 indicating that the state and
some local districts are not raising the educational funds required by their
constitutions. Federal funds are not the cause of this inadequacy, but federal
funds mask a portion of the inadequacy in various districts. For instance, if a
court determined that school districts spending ten thousand dollars per pupil
were providing adequate resources, around one thousand dollars per pupil
might be coming from Title I funds. Under these circumstances, the school
district would not be delivering the state-mandated adequate education on its
own, but only with the assistance of federal money. To be precise, if Congress
decided to withhold federal money from such school districts tomorrow, the
districts, absent making up the shortfall, would soon deliver inadequate
educational opportunities.
The current purpose of federal money is not to cure a state's own deficiency,
but to provide supplemental resources for disadvantaged children. However,
given the findings and outcomes in numerous state finance cases, Title I funds
are likely simply filling the funding gaps and shortfalls that the states and
school districts themselves create. By doing so, Title I funds mask the
unconstitutional action of these school districts and states. As Ross Weiner
concludes in an examination of Texas and Colorado schools, "federal and other
categorical funds, which were intended to provide additional opportunities, are
used to fill in for inequitable distribution of foundational funds." 258 Federal
funds are indirectly subsidizing middle-class schools rather than elevating
funding at high-poverty schools; without federal funds filling the gap, the
states would be underfunding poor schools while adequately funding others. 259
257 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Ky. 1989)
(finding that Kentucky General Assembly violated Kentucky constitutional provision that
the state educate its students through an efficient school system); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
V), 710 A.2d 450, 455-57 (N.J. 1998) (recounting the long history of the educational
litigation under the state constitution and the affirmation of various rights); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that state funding system
violated New York constitution because it did not allow for a "sound basic education" as
provided in state constitution); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 883 (W. Va. 1979)
(remanding to lower court for determination by educational experts of whether school
district "is being operated in reasonably efficient manner").
258 Ross Wiener, CTR. FOR Am. PROGREss, Strengthening Comparability: Advancing

Equity in Public Education, in ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 148, at 40.
259 Id.
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In such a case, many state constitutions would force states like Texas and
Colorado to allocate more money to poor districts and less to the other
districts. It is only the existence of federal funds that allows states to avoid this
change in their funding practices. In effect, Title I funds are doing the states'
job for them and allowing them to engage in otherwise unconstitutional action.
Rather than address or stop these potential state constitutional violations, Title
I permits and becomes complicit in them.
2. Comparability Standards
Title I's comparability standards fare even worse than its non-supplanting
and maintenance-of-effort standards in enforcing equity. Although the
comparability standards are far easier to enforce, Congress has consciously
chosen to dilute the standards. As a result, the comparability standards
disregard obvious school inequity and even sanction it. Both at the state and
local level, Congress knowingly provides Title I funds to school systems that
distribute funds and resources inequitably. 260 At the state level, Title I does not
even purport to require equitable resource distribution among school districts.
Thus, one school district could spend five thousand dollars per student while a
neighboring district spends ten thousand dollars per student without violating
any aspect of Title I. In fact, this occurs every day in school districts that
receive Title I funds. 261 To make matters worse, such disproportionate
spending occurs in states that actually receive more Title I money per pupil
than states that do a better job of ensuring equity among districts. Most
notably, New York and Pennsylvania are among the top fifteen states in terms
of their Title I per-pupil allotments, yet New York maintains a funding gap
between its high-poverty and low-poverty schools districts of $2319 per pupil
and Pennsylvania maintains a $1001 per pupil gap. 262 Again, Title I in no way
prevents this inequity.
In all fairness, Title I does include a Finance Incentive Grant program. 263
To be eligible for the program, however, a state need only ensure that, after
discarding the school districts with the top and bottom five percent per-pupil
expenditures, the remaining schools' per-pupil expenditures are within twentyfive percent of one another. 264 The program would still allow unlimited
260 The accuracy of this statement is demonstrated by cases where there has been state
liability, but no change or action regarding the availability of federal funds. See, e.g., Rose,
790 S.W.2d at 189-90 (finding liability but not addressing the relevance of federal funds);
Campaignfor FiscalEquity, 801 N.E.2d at 328.
261 See generally THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12 (discussing how disparate state

spending among school districts shortchanges highest poverty districts).
262 Id. at 3 tbl.1, 7 tbl.3.
263

20 U.S.C. § 6337 (2006).

264 34 C.F.R. § 222.162 (2008). The actual disparity, therefore, is larger than twenty-five

percent, as the regulation exempts the top and bottom five percent spending districts from
comparison. The amount of funds a state is eligible for under this particular grant does
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disparities among school districts at the top and bottom of the state in per-pupil
spending. Moreover, a twenty-five percent variance amongst those in the
middle would permit gross disparities between the remaining schools as well.
For instance, in a state that spent an average of $7000 per pupil, this standard
would allow a spending range from $6125 per pupil to $7875 per pupil among
districts in the middle and unlimited spending gaps in the top and bottom
districts, such as $4000 per pupil in the poorest districts and $10,000 per pupil
in the richest. In effect, the eligibility standards do not promote equity at all,
as states like New York and Pennsylvania have little problem meeting the
standards, notwithstanding the gross disparities they maintain. Even if the
eligibility requirements were more stringent, the finance incentive program is
small and has no application to the general Title I formulas, which do not even
address the issue of inter-district inequity.
Title I's comparability requirements apply only within school districts, not
between them. 26 5 However, even within school districts, the comparability
requirements do not ensure or promote equity. In fact, the language of the
requirements is specifically watered down to limit their impact. Rather than
requiring comparability of resources or funds, the comparability standards only
require comparable "services," 26 6 an inherently subjective and less quantifiable
concept. To emphasize this point, Title I explicitly indicates that the Act
should not be read to require equalized resources. 267 Moreover, Title I does
not mandate absolute comparability, only that services be "substantially
comparable" based on school services "as a whole." 2 68 As a practical matter,
this indefinite requirement of comparability means that schools need not be
comparable in any meaningful way.
First, Title I entirely exempts the largest expenditure in school budgets from
comparability analysis. Teacher salaries regularly account for eighty to ninety
percent of school budgets, 269 but Title I explicitly exempts them from
scrutiny. 270 To demonstrate that schools are comparable in regard to teaching
resources, school districts need only maintain a single salary schedule that
increase as the spending gap between its districts decrease, but the reward is so meager that
it provides no real incentive for equity. See Liu, supra note 142, at 985. Moreover, because
of minimum and maximum weights in the formula, even if large amounts of money were
distributed, most education agencies would receive a similar per pupil expenditure. Id. at
988 (analyzing the weighting factors in the Finance Incentive Grant).
265 McClure, supra note 148, at 26 (recognizing that comparability has always been
defined as equality within a district, not across districts).
266 20 U.S.C. § 632 1(c)(1)(b).
267 Id. § 6576.
268 Id. § 6321(c)(1)(b).
269 Press Release, Education Trust, No Accounting for Fairness: Additional Federal
and
State Funds Intended for Ohio's Low-Income Students Often Don't Reach the State's
Highest Poverty Schools (Dec. 22, 2008), available at http://www.edtrust.org/dc/pressroom/press-release/no-accounting-for-fairness-additional-federal-and-state-funds-intended-f.
270 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(2)(B).
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applies to all schools in the district. 27 1 Thus, so long as all first-year teachers
in a school district are paid the same and all fifth-year teachers are paid the
same, schools' teaching resources are considered equivalent. However, a
salary schedule is simply part of the compensation policy in school districts.
Real inequities arise, not from variations in salary schedules, but from the
unequal distribution of teachers among schools. Under Title I's comparability
standard, all of the twenty-year teachers could be placed at a single school and
all of the first-year teachers at another without violating comparability.
Assuming there were twenty-five teachers at each school and the salary gap
between the experienced teachers and the new teachers was $30,000 each, the
school with the experienced teachers would have $750,000 more in its budget
than the other school. Unfortunately, this scenario is not just a hypothetical,
but the prevailing reality in many places. Poor and minority schools employ
far more inexperienced teachers than other schools and also generally lose
these same teachers to whiter and richer schools as soon as they gain
experience.2 72 Still, under Title I's comparability standards, these schools are
nonetheless comparable.
Second, although it does not constitute as large a portion of school budgets
as teacher salaries, the comparability standards do not apply to central
administration expenditures, such as gifted and talented programs. 273 School
districts generally fund these programs out of their central budgets rather than
through individual school budgets. 274 Central administration may also fund
tutoring services, pre-kindergarten, and other supplemental programs that do

271 Id. § 6321(c)(2)(A).
272 See ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., THE
SEGREGATION
OF
AMERICAN
TEACHERS
34-39
(2006),
available
at

http:H/www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/segregation-americanteachersl2-06.pdf
(demonstrating that as the percentage of minority students in a school rises, the qualification
and experience level of teachers therein tends to decrease); Catherine E. Freeman et al.,
Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994-2001: Trends, Causes, and Impact on
Teacher Quality, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 148, 157-59
(John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005) (discussing statistics from Georgia public
schools which indicate that teachers serving higher proportions of minority students are
more likely to move to schools with smaller proportions of minority students); Wendy
Parker,Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1, 35-37 (2008) (evaluating research
showing that white teachers tend to leave high-minority schools); Jay Mathews, Top
Teachers Rare in Poor Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002, at A5 (discussing the dearth of
high-quality teachers in low-income schools); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The
Black-White Test Score Gap: Why It Persists and What Can Be Done, BROOKINGS INST.
(Spring
1998),
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/spring-educationjencks.aspx
("Predominantly white schools seem to attract more skilled teachers than black schools ...
273 Marguerite Roza, THE EDUCATION TRUST, How Districts Shortchange Low-Income

and Minority Students, in FUNDING GAPS 2006, supra note 12, at 9, 10-11.
274 Id. at 11.
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not show up in any schools' budgets even though they are offered at specific
schools. Ironically, these supplemental programs are the same type of
opportunities that Title I is designed to fund at high-poverty schools. 27 5 By
exempting these programs, central administrations are free to distribute these
funds and programs unequally between their schools. In the case of gifted and
talented programs, the inequity is clear when one school has them and another
does not. The result is far less obvious, but just as problematic, when
supplemental programs at non-Title I schools mirror those at Title I schools.
Rather than providing students at Title I schools supplemental services beyond
what others receive, Title I funds become necessary just to provide services at
high-poverty schools that are comparable with other schools. Thus, ironically,
Title I creates the very means by which to undermine its purpose by failing to
enforce comparability between schools.
Third, as to the remaining small portion of school budgets to which
comparability standards do apply, Title I still refuses to require strict equality.
The initial enactments of Title I and its regulations required that funding per
pupil at Title I schools be within five percent of non-Title I schools within the
school district. 276 The five percent variance, however, was later abandoned
and today's version makes no reference to spending equity. 277 In fact, the
statute now states the opposite: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to mandate equalized spending per pupil for a state, local educational agency,
or school." 27 8
The Department of Education's policy guidance on
comparability is no better. Although the guidance suggests that dollar amounts
are relevant, it indicates that a school district can demonstrate comparability if
the per-pupil funding at each school in the district is within ten percent of the
district average. 279 But to permit a twenty percent funding gap between
schools in a single school district is essentially the same as not requiring equity
at all, as this would allow for gaps in excess of one thousand dollars per
student in the poorest states and gaps of approximately two thousand dollars
per student in the richest states. 280 Moreover, this measure of comparability is
only a suggested option. Title I permits school districts to adopt their own

275 Id.

§ 116.26 (1972) (requiring comparability at a five percent variance between
Title I and non-Title I schools); 45 C.F.R. § 116a.26 (1977) (requiring the same five percent
276 45 C.F.R.

comparability between title I and non-title I schools); see also McClure, supra note 148, at
18.
277 45 C.F.R. § 116 (1978); see also McClure, supra note 148, at 18-22.
278 20 U.S.C. § 6576 (2006).
279 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE I FISCAL ISSUEs 16, 34 (2008) [hereinafter TITLE I FISCAL
ISSUES], availableat http://www.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.doc.
280 These calculations are based on states that spend the lowest per pupil, at five thousand
dollars, and those that spend the highest, at nearly ten thousand. See THE EDUCATION
TRUST, supra note 12, at 4 tbl.2.
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means of demonstrating comparability. 281 An audit by the Office of Inspector
General reveals that many schools and states have simply taken advantage of
this flexibility, adopting inconsistent standards or failing to maintain the
relevant data required under the standards. 282
Finally, even if the comparability standards themselves were not flawed, the
dilution of Title I funds across so many schools creates a practical problem in
measuring comparability. The comparability standards measure Title I schools
against non-Title I schools within a school district. 283 However, there are often
few, if any, non-Title I schools against which to compare Title I schools
because so many schools receive Title I funds. 284 In fact, in some school
districts, every school is a Title I school. 285 Thus the ability to hold a district
accountable for fairly funding its Title I schools is diminished, and
comparability becomes largely irrelevant. 286 This flaw relates back to Title I's
narrow focus on monitoring inequity only within school districts rather than
between them on a statewide basis.
In summary, the various Title I standards that should promote equity among
schools have little if any effect in this respect. Instead, in many instances they
sanction inequity and provide the flexibility for such inequity to expand. The
prohibition on supplanting local dollars with federal funds is practically
unenforceable and, thus, under-enforced in reality. The maintenance-of-effort
standard lacks the strictness necessary to prevent schools from drawing down
their educational commitment and replacing it with federal dollars. And most
disturbing, the comparability standards exempt the largest portion of schools'
budgets from any scrutiny and, in the remaining areas of the budget, impose
standards that allow for so much variance that the standards are meaningless.
In short, although Title I includes concepts that one would expect to promote
equity, the actual standards provide essentially no check on the inequities that
states and school districts perpetrate on their students.
3. Disregard for Existing State Equity Obligations
Many of the inequities that Title I sanctions and furthers are primarily the
result of lax standards and ill-fitting funding formulas that could be cured by
relatively small adjustments to the statute. The most significant oversight in
281 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FINAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

2
http://www.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2008

REPORT: MONITORING OF THE TITLE I, PART A, COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES REQUIREMENT

(2007),
available
/xO5hOOl7.pdf.

at

212 Id. at 2-3.

20 U.S.C. § 6321(c).
See NUMBERS AND TYPES, supra note 131, tbl.2; McClure, supra note 148, at 23.
2" McClure, supra note 148, at 23.
283

284

286 TITLE I FISCAL ISSUES, supra note 279, at 32-34 (proffering ways for districts with all

Title I schools to establish comparability, such as using local and state funds to provide
services that are comparable in each school).
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Title I, however, is its failure to account for states' compliance with their state
constitutional obligations. Moreover, this oversight is not as easily cured.
Over the past twenty years in particular, state constitutions, supreme courts,
and statutes have increasingly obligated states to deliver an equitable and/or a
qualitative level of education (including the inputs necessary to do so),287 but
Congress has paid scant attention to these developments. Scores of court
orders have mandated specific expenditures, specific improvements, and
specific educational opportunities in public schools. 288 Unfortunately, states
and school districts have too often failed to meet these obligations. Congress,
however, has not inquired as to whether state educational agencies are
complying with these orders or how state obligations might affect Title I's
notions of comparability and its distribution of funds. 289 Title I simply ignores
state and local educational agencies' responsibilities under state law.
Were state and local agencies' failures only violations of their respective
state constitutions and laws, congressional disregard for these state obligations
would be understandable. But in some instances, these state constitutional
violations are also federal constitutional violations. Although the Supreme
Court refused to find that education is a fundamental right in 1973 in San
Antonio v. Rodriguez,290 significant legal and factual developments in state
courts have reduced the import of Rodriguez.291 Because plaintiffs have
almost exclusively brought educational quality and equity cases in state courts,
the federal courts have yet to revisit the requirements of federal equal
protection in light of these developments. These developments, however, are
so fundamental that any court with intellectual honesty would be forced to
evaluate education differently than did the Court in Rodriguez.

287 See Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 15-20) (discussing issues that have resulted
from state-based legislation, with regard to developing standards to ensure adequacy of
education); Rebell, supra note 19, at 1527 (discussing the outcomes in school finance
cases).
288 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (mandating a strict scrutiny
standard for assessing state public school financing systems); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989) (declaring Kentucky's entire system of common
schools unconstitutional and placing a duty on the General Assembly to recreate a new
system for the state); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 460-71 (N.J. 1998)
(evaluating whether several programs and resources were necessary to provide an adequate
education); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 240-41 (Tenn. 2002)
(mandating that the legislature must devise a way for teacher salary equalization to comport
with the State's constitutional directive to provide equal educational opportunities); see also
Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 15-18).
289 See Student Bill of Rights, H.R. 2451, 111th Cong. §§ 111-202 (1st Sess. 2009)
(discussing the purpose of the bill as providing for equitable resources and congressional
monitoring of equity, with no reference regarding previous attempts in this respect).
290 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
291See Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 5).
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The full explanation and analysis of these changes and their effect on equal
protection is the entire subject of a recent article. 292 Thus, for the purpose of
this Article, it suffices only to make a few basic points. First, all states have
constitutional clauses that obligate the state to provide education to its
citizens. 293 Second, since Rodriguez, over half of the state supreme courts
have interpreted those clauses to require either equity between schools and/or a
certain qualitative level of education. 294 Third, in implementing these
constitutional clauses and state supreme court decisions, state legislatures have
enacted extensive statutory and regulatory regimes that provide substance and
entitlement to education far beyond what was in place at the time of
Rodriguez.295 Fourth, these decisions and statutory changes have shifted
responsibility for education from local education agencies to the state. 296
These major developments, along with some other minor ones, have
undermined all the legal and factual predicates upon which the Supreme Court
decided Rodriguez. Moreover, developments in the Supreme Court's equal
protection and due process precedent suggest its analysis would be different
were it to address educational inequities again. 297
In short, the underlying educational right at issue in Rodriguez is entirely
distinct from the evolved constitutional right that now exists under state law.
Thus, Rodriguez's deferential scrutiny of education, which was equivalent to
scrutiny that the Court might exact regarding gratuitous state services such as
transportation, is simply no longer appropriate. 298 Now that states have
extended affirmative constitutional rights to education for their citizens,
securing these rights for some, but not others, is not an option. Federal equal
protection attaches to these state constitutional rights and requires the federal
courts to scrutinize seriously inequalities that may arise in education.
Moreover, because the underlying right in such a claim would be different than
292 See generally id.
293 Hubsch, supra note 18, at 96-97.
294 See Rebell, supra note
"ADEQUACY"

SCHOOL

19, at 1527; NAT'L ACCESS NETWORK, "EQUITY" AND

FUNDING

LIABILITY

COURT

DECISIONs

(June

2009),

http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/New Charts/06_2009eq-ad-schoolfundinliability.
pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
295 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN.

§

156.160-.210 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN.

STAT. §§ 115C-1 to -583 (2007 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-253.13:1 (Supp.
2009).
296 E.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-13, 216 (Ky. 1989)
(indicating the responsibility for education rests with the state); Robinson v. Cahill, 303
A.2d 273, 291-92 (N.J. 1973); see also Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy of Education
Federalism,56 EMORY L.J. 125, 131 (2006) (finding the notion of local control in education
an illusion).
297 See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundationsfor a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 550, 563-96 (1992).
298 Black, supra note 17 (manuscript at 47).
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in Rodriguez, a court would not be asked to overturn Rodriguez, but rather
simply apply basic equal protection principles in light of these new
circumstances.2 99
The fact that courts have yet to entertain or recognize a claim consistent
with the foregoing, however, does not obviate Congress's responsibility.
Congress's duty is not dependent on judicial action, but rather coextensive
with it. The important question is simply whether the states' actions are in
some instances contrary to affording students equal protection. Given the
factual and legal developments regarding the nature of education, the answer is
yes. Thus, if Congress funds state education systems that are violating their
state constitutional obligations, Congress is funding a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Title I's inequitable distribution of funds
and counterproductive equity standards not only fund these violations, in some
instances, they further them. Furthering equal protection violations may not be
Congress's purpose, and Title I does not affirmatively require states to violate
their constitutions, but these arguments only protect Congress from lawsuits
based on taxpayer standing. 300 They have no bearing on Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment duty to further equal protection. Regardless of its
intent, Congress could in no way be said to further equal protection by funding
education agencies that are violating equal protection, particularly given that
Title I goes out of its way to permit these inequities and expands them in some
instances. In short, Congress is complicit in states' violations of Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment and engages in its own violation of Section Five
of the Amendment.
Congress's action is analogous to that described in Shapiro v. Thompson,30
where the Court, albeit in dicta, indicated Congress could not spend funds to
assist a school district in building segregated schools, even if Congress's
purpose was a broader one of simply building new schools. 302 Here, Congress
is achieving the functional equivalent by giving states Title I money with
which to mask or fund their equal protection violations. Even if Congress's
purpose is to fund education generally, it is providing funds to states and local
educational agencies that unequally distribute educational resources in ways
that violate their state constitutions and, by extension, federal equal protection.
Merely placing conditions on Title I funds that limited these inequities would
cure the Act, but Congress has failed to do so. Moreover, as demonstrated by
the earlier discussion of the funding formulas, Title I funds actually operate to
In essence,
widen the funding gap between some school districts.
congressional actions make an unconstitutional situation worse.
Finally, putting aside Congress's duty to enforce equality, its willingness to
ignore the existing legal obligations of states and local school districts is
Id. (manuscript at 43-47).
3 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
299

301 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
302 Id. at 641.
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contrary to the historic role Congress has played in education. Congress's
initial purpose in extending federal funds to schools was to achieve what the
courts had been unable to achieve: rapid and widespread desegregation. 303
Congress conditioned receipt of federal school funds on compliance with Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal courts' interpretation of
Brown v. Board and its progeny. 304 Moreover, this requirement was
aggressively monitored through compliance reports, enforcement actions,
regulations, and the threat of fund termination. 305 That Congress does not
similarly monitor compliance in regard to resource, quality, and finance equity
(which are mandated under state laws) simply defies the entire purpose of
federal intervention in schools and the stated purpose of Title I: to improve the
educational opportunities of disadvantaged students. 306
III. REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS AND TITLE I'S FLAWS

The foregoing Parts demonstrate that Congress, having entered the field of
education, has a duty to act consistent with equal protection. In the initial
years, Congress carried out this duty, but more recently it has not. The
distribution of federal dollars now exacerbates inequalities between schools by
arbitrarily rewarding some states, punishing poor ones, and allocating funds on
factors that are irrelevant to students' needs and schools' expenses. 307 Even as
to the most important factor in student need, the level of concentrated poverty,
Title I formulas are ineffective. 308 Likewise, Title I ignores and explicitly
exempts massive inequalities from scrutiny. 309 As to the few remaining areas
where Title I purports to enforce equity, the standards are either so flexible that
they are meaningless or so flawed that they are administratively
unenforceable. 310
When Congress reauthorizes Title I sometime this year, it has a
constitutional responsibility to correct these deficiencies. Congress could
rectify the deficiencies and drastically further equal protection in education by
adopting four basic proposals. First, if Congress does nothing else, it must
See

supra note 3, at 312-40.
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
305 See, e.g., id. § 2000d-1 (providing for termination of funds if a local education agency
fails to comply with requirements of the section); JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, HISTORICAL
303

ORFIELD,

DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

188-90 (1998) (discussing the Office for Civil Rights's ("OCR") historical role in
desegregation); David Barton Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil
Rights Monitoring and Report Cards, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 75, 87-88 (1998)
(discussing OCR's absorption with school desegregation in the late 1970s).
306 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
307See supra Parts II.C, II.D.
308See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.

3 See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
310See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
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require compliance with all state constitutional and statutory orders and
obligations in education as a condition on the receipt of federal funds. Second,
Congress should require equitable per-pupil distribution of resources both
between and within school districts, which would include eliminating the
current exemptions for certain expenditures. Third, Congress should provide
individuals with a federal cause of action should states fail to comply with
either of the foregoing conditions. Fourth, Congress should use Title I to
affirmatively promote equity through financial incentives and meet the needs
of the most disadvantaged students by focusing those funds.
A.

Compliance with Existing State Constitutionaland Statutory
Requirements

Insofar as some states violate both federal equal protection and their own
state constitutions, Congress must not further, sanction, or participate in these
violations. The only options that are consistent with Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment duty are to simply stop funding public education altogether or
condition the receipt of funds upon compliance with existing state
constitutional and statutory obligations. As the former is not a realistic
political option, Congress must choose the latter.
Including language that conditions receipt of federal funds on compliance
with state requirements would be simple enough. 311 The more complicated
task would be enforcing the condition. As the exact constitutional and
statutory educational requirements vary from state to state, 312 federal
legislation could not rely on a single standard that captured states' varying
individual obligations. Moreover, simply mandating "compliance with state
obligations" might exclude too many details and leave too much to
interpretation. The more complicated, but better, option would be to define
those categories of state obligations by which the federal government would
evaluate states. At the very least, those categories should include: (1) any open
court orders that relate to the quality or financing of education; (2) any
standards or inputs that are included within those orders; (3) any state statutes
that relate to educational quality or finance; and (4) any standards or inputs
included within past court orders that would necessarily be relevant to future
compliance should a court reopen the case.
Demonstrating that older court orders were closed would be simple. Open
court orders, however, would involve more nuance, as states would be required
to show that they were in compliance with the standards included within any
order or that they were making good faith progress toward that end. In most
instances, state court decisions in this area list the various measures of a
3" See, e.g., Student Bill of Rights, H.R. 2451,
Ith Cong., § 123 (1st Sess. 2009)
(proposing to require states to comply with existing court orders in education).
312 William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School
Finance Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 25-30 (1993) (discussing the unique history and
language of state education clauses).
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constitutional education. 313 These court orders and standards, however, would
not only be the basis for evaluating past compliance, but also future
compliance. Title I should require states to continue complying with relevant
standards in the future. The inherent nature of court action is to resolve
disputes over past events and bring litigation to an end. 314 Once a state
demonstrates it has complied with an order or standard, the court closes the
case, only revisiting the issues if a plaintiff brings a new claim.3 15 But the
failure of a plaintiff to raise a new claim in subsequent years does not mean
that a state is continuing to meet its constitutional obligations. Thus, Title I
should use court orders and standards as both a measure of past and future
compliance. Title I should likewise require states to meet their own
substantive statutory requirements. In many instances, state educational
statutes are but extensions or implementations of a state's constitutional

See, e.g., Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734-35
(Idaho 1993) (incorporating state educational standards into the meaning of constitutional
adequacy); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (concluding
that an efficient education requires "(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to
enable students to function in . . . civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social,
and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that
affect his or her . . . nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient [art and cultural appreciation]; [and] (vi) . . .
preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields"); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (finding that several of the
Board of Regents's learning standards fell within the constitutional requirements for a
"sound basic education").
31 See Richard B. Hoffman & Barry Mahoney, Managing Caseflow in State
Intermediate Appellate Courts: What Mechanisms, Practices,and ProceduresCan Work to
Reduce Delay?, 35 IND. L. REv. 467, 475, 510-13 (2002) (discussing the appellate courts'
role in bringing litigation to a quick and efficient resolution); see also ABA COMM'N ON
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.36 cmt.,
at 61 (1977).
31 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 748 A.2d 82, 84-85 (N.J. 2000) (discussing the
court's expectation that its previous decision would have brought the case to an end and
only revisiting the issues upon the plaintiffs motion); id. at 95-96 (rejecting "the
appointment of a Judge of the Superior Court as a Standing Master" in the case and instead
reaffirming that the disputes should be decided by others with the statutory responsibility to
do so).
313
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obligations. 316 In other instances, the statutes simply create independent
rights.317 Either way, Title I should require compliance with the statutes.
In regard to statutes or court standards relating to things such as certified
teachers, facilities, finances, and other objective criteria, measuring
compliance will often be a matter of comparing basic numbers. However, in
regard to the quality of education, compliance is more difficult to determine.
Courts have regularly relied on student achievement tests, graduation rates, and
college preparedness to determine the quality of education in schools. 3 18 To
the extent states have relied on these measures, the federal government should
rely on them as well. When state courts have left this issue open, the only
option may be for the Department of Education to enact guidelines that provide
states with a series of means by which to demonstrate compliance in regard to
curriculum.319 Such guidelines, however, must not leave the choice entirely to
the discretion of the state, as such an approach has proven ineffective in
enforcing Title I standards elsewhere. 320
B.

Equitable Per-PupilExpenditures

Title I must reassert its former stance regarding equitable per-pupil
expenditures. Ensuring equity in expenditures today would require a series of
small changes and a few new requirements. First, Congress should eliminate

311 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 157.010 (LexisNexis 2006) (indicating the school
fund is dedicated for the purpose of carrying out the constitutional duty of common
schools). See generally Charles J. Russo et al., The Kentucky Education Reform Act and
Gifted Education: Overlooked or Ignored?, 3 Ky. CHILD. RTS. J. I (1994) (discussing the
Kentucky Education Reform Act as a response to the state's supreme court decision
regarding the constitutionality of its education system).
311 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.20 (West 2009) (granting parents and students
various rights, such as regular information regarding students' academic progress); GA.
CODE ANN. § 20-2-143(d) (2009) (granting parents the right to opt their children out of sex
education).
318 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 525-26 (N.J. 1998) (directing the
state to make particular provisions in regard to facilities); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693
A.2d 417, 425-30 (N.J. 1997) (discussing achievement on standardized state tests and its
relevance to the constitutionality of the school system); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State,
599 S.E.2d 365, 372, 383 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing student performance on
curriculum and standardized state tests); id. at 385-86 (evaluating whether students' courses

of study prepare them for college); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
176 S.W.3d 746, 787 (Tex. 2005) (examining college-preparedness, dropout rates, and low
passing rates on standardized tests); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 15, 106,
115, W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528 (250th Dist. Ct.,
Travis County, Tex. Sept. 30, 2004) (discussing graduation rates), available at
http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/legal/FindingsofFactandConclusionsofLawWOC.pdf.
31 For a discussion of how the federal government might develop a set of qualitative
educational standards, see Rebell, supra note 19, at 1517-26.
320 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 281, at 2-3.
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the comparability exemptions for teacher salaries and central administration
expenditures. 321 When comparing schools, all state and local dollars expended
therein should be evaluated. Second, Congress should include an explicit
measure of comparability, as opposed to "substantial comparability." 322 As to
non-quantitative measures, the substantial comparability standard could
remain. But as to school finances in particular, Congress should require that
state and local expenditures and resources at Title I schools are at least ninetyfive percent of those at non-Title I schools. 323 Third, Congress should not
place any caps on what may be spent at Title I schools. Researchers uniformly
agree that low-income and at-risk children require additional educational
resources to succeed; the only thing in question is the exact additional
expenditure that is necessary. 324 Given this clear additional need, Congress
should permit localities to spend as many additional funds as they see fit on the
education of poor and at-risk children.
Fourth, Congress should apply comparability standards not just within
school districts, but also between them. 325 Because the cost of education varies
across districts and between categories of students, 326 the variance here would
need to be larger than the five percent standard within school districts. This
wider variance, however, would still require further nuance to prevent creating
unreasonable inequities and hardships. 327 Congress should include cost factors
in its comparability analysis. After accounting for cost factors, the actual
expenditures of school districts in a state need not be exactly within a specific
range of the state average because school districts in cities, for instance, would
have a higher cost basis. Thus, one cost factor would be based on locality.
The measure should also include a "need" factor because at-risk, poor, and
special education students require more resources than general education
students. In fact, some states are constitutionally obligated to provide

321

See 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring only a uniform salary schedule and

exempting pay difference related to longevity).
322 See id. § 6321(c)(1)(B).
323 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 281, at 4-6 (providing multiple ways that

schools can demonstrate compliance and allowing for a ten percent variance).
324See supra note 177 for sources estimating a cost increase of anywhere from thirty to
sixty percent.
325See McClure, supra note 148, at 26 (discussing how the comparability requirements
have previously only been applied within school districts).
326 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 393-94 (N.J. 1990) (discussing
the unique administrative burdens that cities confront based on the various services they
must offer citizens outside of education); id. at 400-04 (discussing the special and additional
needs of poor students in urban districts).
327 See, e.g., id. at 393-94 (factoring in the unique municipal overburden that urban

districts face).

HeinOnline -- 90 B.U. L. Rev. 367 2010

368

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:313

additional resources for these students. 328 By factoring in need, school districts
with high percentages of these students might be permitted to spend far more
than other districts. By widening the allowed variances and factoring in costs
and need, the comparability analysis would not affect most school districts, but
it would force states to account for wide variances that tend to seriously
disadvantage districts with large numbers of needy children.
Finally, per the GAO's recommendations, Congress should eliminate the
supplement-not-supplant standard. 329 In conjunction with this elimination,
Congress should narrow the maintenance-of-effort requirement from ninety
percent of the previous year's expenditures to ninety-five percent. 330 This
narrower standard would not only ensure that districts maintain their base of
funding, but it would also effectively prevent a district from any major
supplanting of local funds. Moreover, ensuring the maintenance of this base
coincides with ensuring that states are meeting their constitutional and
statutory requirements with their own funds, rather than allowing Congress to
mask inequities. 33 1
C.

PrivateFederal Cause ofAction

Congress should not leave the enforcement of its equity standards or
compliance with state obligations solely to federal agencies. 332 First, to do so
would be inconsistent with other legislation that furthers equal protection. The
conditions on federal funds regarding race, gender, disability, age, and
language all include private causes of action. 333 Second, individuals and
advocacy groups at the local level may often recognize inequities before a
federal agency would. Alternatively, they might simply spot inequities that an
agency overlooked or was unwilling to force a state or school district to
remedy. 334 Third, when inequities exist, individuals should not be dependent
328 See, e.g., id. at 390; Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (N.C. 1997) (recognizing
the state's responsibility to provide resources to certain districts in light of their students'
special needs).

329 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 248, at 24-25.

330 Id. at 26 (recommending that the current ninety percent maintenance-of-effort
standard be increased); see also McClure, supra note 148, at 25-26 (demonstrating the
problem with the current maintenance-of-effort and supplement-not-supplant standard).
3 See supraPart II.E.l.
332 The proposed Student Bill of Rights, H.R. 2451, 111th Cong. § 132 (1st Sess. 2009),
would provide for such a right.
33 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2006) (creating a cause of action to enforce
individual rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act); id. § 1706
(creating an individual cause of action under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001) (recognizing that a cause of action
under Title VI exists for intentional discrimination); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
690-94 (1979) (recognizing an implied private cause of action under Title IX).
334 For instance, because the only real remedy that the Department of Education has is to
terminate funding, which is drastic and could harm innocent students, the agency may
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or forced to wait on federal agencies to vindicate their right to quality and
equitable schools.335 Finally, individual lawsuits would further encourage
voluntary compliance and relieve some of the monitoring and enforcement
pressures that would otherwise rest with agencies.
D.

Incentivize Equity and Meet Student Needs

Because Congress has not enforced equity in Title I in any meaningful way
for several years, states and school districts will likely perceive all of the
foregoing as significant impositions that threaten their ability to provide
education. As many have operated with and expanded inequity as a general
practice for several years, immediately reversing these structures would exact
significant costs on some school districts and schools, as the states and districts
would be expected to redirect funds. Some school districts and schools would
face the prospect of losing funds, which could cause undue hardships in some
instances. 336 To offset this possibility and the political objections it would
draw, Congress should incentivize equity through the funding formulas as well
as provide a gradual transition to new funding patterns.
A gradual transition would mean flattening expenditures in the existing
formulas immediately, and then gradually drawing them down over time. As
for the new formulas, they should eliminate funding based on state
expenditures, which penalizes poor states, and replace it with a metric that
accurately reflects locality cost, student need, and state effort. 337 However, the
primary weighting of funds should be based on the level of equity that states
and school districts maintain. As the level of inequity between school districts
decreases, the formula should provide more funds to the state. This weighting
alone is unlikely to encourage states to reduce inequity and would simply
reward those that have already done so of their own accord. To actually
encourage states to close gaps, the formulas should reward states based on any
increases in equity that they achieve. Thus, those states that make good-faith
efforts toward achieving equity would receive additional assistance in meeting
encounter situations where it is unwilling to enforce a statute fully. See Julia Lamber,
Private Causes of Action Under Federal Agency NondiscriminationStatutes, 10 CONN. L.
REV. 859, 888 & n.150 (1978) (observing that the relevant agency had terminated funding
for only three educational institutions in fourteen years).
3 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704-08 (finding that "effective" protection of individual
rights requires a private cause of action and that administrative enforcement of a statute does
not necessarily include the vindication of individual rights); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d
1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the D.C. District Court had jurisdiction over
challenge to the U.S. Office of Civil Rights's failure to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and desegregate schools).
336 Actually, terminating funds under Title I would be no less problematic than it has
been for other forms of non-discrimination. Concerned with the practical effect that fund
termination would have on students, the Department of Education is simply reluctant to use
this measure. See Lamber, supra note 334, at 888 & n.150.
337 THE EDUCATION TRUST, supra note 12, at 3 tbl.1, 4 tbl.2.
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their goal. Moreover, to account for the limited capacity to raise or move
funds in poorer states, the formula should provide a proportionally greater
level of assistance to poorer states.
Finally, Title I should not only encourage states to achieve equity, it should
return to its initial mission of meeting student needs. In particular, it should
help those that need help the most. Those children are the ones attending
schools with the highest concentrations of impoverished students. To
appropriately meet those students' needs, the formula should increase the perpupil allotments as the level of impoverished students increases. Currently, the
increase flattens at levels of approximately thirty percent impoverished
students. 338 Rather than flatten, the formula should exponentially increase the
allotment with no cap. 339 The only caveat would be the possibility that, by
providing additional funds for concentrated poverty, Title I might create a
perverse incentive for states and districts to maintain or increase existing levels
of socioeconomic and racial isolation between their school districts. Thus,
while Title I must help meet student needs in high poverty schools and
districts, it must also include provisions that withhold funding increases for
school districts or states that enact new policies that increase the concentration
of poor students in particular districts. Moreover, to encourage states and
school districts to deconcentrate poverty, Title I should hold harmless any
school districts or states that enact new policies that deconcentrate their poor
students. For instance, some inner city school districts have enacted interdistrict transfer programs that send poor and/or minority students to a suburban
district with lower levels of poverty and racial isolation.340 For at least a
period of three years, school districts, such as the inner city ones transferring
students out, should be eligible for the same level of funding that they received
when their percentage of poor students was higher and the receiving school
districts should receive additional Title I funds.
The foregoing alone, unfortunately, would have no effect on the segregation
or desegregation of poor students between schools within a single school
district. The current formulas base funding on districts' overall poverty levels
rather than individual schools. 34 1 The poverty levels at particular schools only
affect how the district divides the money among its schools.342 Thus, districts
338 20 U.S.C.

§§ 6335(c)(1)(B), 6337(d)(1)(A).
339 For a discussion of research demonstrating that the negative effects of poverty
continue to grow as the percentage of poor students in a school grows, see supra note 193

and accompanying text.
340 See generally Amy Stuart Wells et al., Charles Hamilton Houston Inst. for Race &
Just., Boundary Crossing for Diversity, Equity and Achievement: Inter-district School
Desegregation and Educational Opportunity (2009) (detailing the various inter-district
desegregation
programs
currently
in
effect),
available
at
http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/assets/documents/publications/Wells-BoundaryCrossing
.pdf.
341 20 U.S.C. §§ 6335(c)(1)(B), 6337(d)(1)(A).
342 Id. § 6313.
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can currently concentrate all their poor students within particular schools
without gaining or losing any Title I funds. To encourage poverty
deconcentration at the school level, Title I should begin examining the poverty
concentration between schools within a school district, applying the same
principles that it does at the district level. Title I should provide incentives for
districts that deconcentrate poor students among their schools and penalize
those districts that take actions to concentrate poor students in particular
schools.34 3 In short, these changes would fairly direct additional funds to the
high-poverty school districts that need it the most, but also encourage the
ultimate solution of simply deconcentrating poverty.
E.

Reconciling Equal Protectionwith Current Title I Trends

On their face, these recommendations to monitor the inputs and resources of
schools appear counter to the current political and regulatory trends at the
federal level. The past two iterations of Title I - No Child Left Behind and
The Goals 2000: Educate America Act - have focused primarily on outputs. 344
In particular, standardized student achievement scores have become the means
by which the federal government measures schools' progress. 345 Title I
currently deems schools successful or in need of reform or dissolution based
on whether each of their student subgroups are scoring at particular levels on
standardized tests. 346 Thus, measuring schools based on resources and other

343 Of course, when a district deconcentrates poverty in one school, it necessarily
increases it in another. The prohibition against increasing poverty concentration discussed
above the line refers to those instances where a district draws its school boundaries in a
manner that sends most of its poor students to a single school or group of schools, while
maintaining low levels of poverty elsewhere. For instance, a school district might have one
school with seventy-five percent poverty with all of its other schools having only ten percent
poverty. Such a school district should be penalized if it drives up the percentage of poverty
at the one school above seventy-five percent, and it should not be rewarded when the
percentage of poor students consequently drops below ten percent at other schools.
However, if the district did the opposite and brought the poverty level below seventy-five
percent at the one school, the poverty level would necessarily increase elsewhere. In this
case, the district should be held harmless for the decrease at the one school and given
increased support for deconcentrating poverty at other schools.
3" No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110,115 Stat. 1425 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 6316); Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125.
345 20 U.S.C. § 6316; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative
Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1679
(2007) (criticizing No Child Left Behind for looking exclusively at statewide assessments
and the achievement gaps therein).
346 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, 6316. In fairness, No Child Left Behind does look at teacher
quality, which is an input. Id. § 6319. However, in the first years after its enactment, this
presented a significant concern for school districts, because so many were potentially out of
compliance in regard to this input. See U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NEw No CHILD LEFT BEHIND
FLEXIBILITY: HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS (2004) (providing new alternative means to
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inputs would appear to reverse the current trend and revert to traditional school
evaluations. The Secretary of Education himself has credited the recent
iterations of Title I with focusing on outcomes rather than inputs. 347
Input and output measures, however, are not inherently competing tools, but
rather are often complementary tools. In fact, in the effort to determine
whether schools are meeting their constitutional obligations, state courts have
regularly relied on both, treating inputs as a predicate to having fair
expectations regarding outputs. 3 48 More specifically, when courts have found
that students are entitled to a qualitative level of education, they have relied on
outputs such as standardized test scores to determine whether students are
receiving that education. 349 But when the outputs have revealed that students
are not receiving a constitutionally adequate education, state courts have not
simply responded by indicating that teachers should do a better job teaching
students or administrators a better job allocating funds. Instead, courts have
taken the second step of examining whether schools have sufficient resource
inputs to allow teachers to improve their instruction or administrators to fund
necessary instructional programs. 35 0 For these courts, outputs and inputs are
inherently connected to, rather than disconnected from, one another. This
approach suggests that holding schools accountable for outputs, without
considering the inputs available to those schools, is inappropriate and unfair.
Unfortunately, Title I suffers from this fatal flaw. It demands output
accountability notwithstanding the reality of input inadequacy. Congress may
not be bound to address inadequacy and inequity in schools as a general
at
available
qualified),
highly
are
teachers
that
demonstrate
Regardless, No Child Left
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/methods/teachers/hqtflexibility.pdf.
Behind's overall and primary focus is on outputs.
347 Duncan, supra note 45.
348 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 425-30 (N.J. 1997) (discussing
achievement on standardized state tests and its relevance to the constitutionality of the
school system, but also requiring the state to provide particular inputs); Campaign for Fiscal
Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 336 (N.Y. 2003) (reinstating the trial court's mandate that
the state provide sufficient input resources to permit students to receive a sound basic
education); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 381-84 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (analyzing student performance on curriculum and standardized state tests as part of
the Court's inquiry into whether the state should provide additional resources for school
districts).
349 See, e.g., Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 425-30 (discussing achievement on standardized
state tests and its relevance to the constitutionality of the school system); Hoke County, 599
S.E.2d at 381-84 (analyzing student performance on curriculum and standardized state
tests).
350 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 345 (requiring the state to
provide foundational resources for schools); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91
S.W.3d 232, 240-41 (Tenn. 1998) (requiring the state to provide additional resources for
teacher salaries); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 543 (Wyo. 2001)
(analyzing the state finance system and indicating that it should be reviewed every five
years to ensure its ability to meet student needs).
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principle, but once it enters the field of education, it is prohibited from
reinforcing inadequacy and inequity. It is likewise prohibited from funding the
current constitutional violations in which some states engage. Accepting this
responsibility, however, does not mean that Congress must abandon its
concern with outputs; it need only account for the relevance of inputs in
measuring outputs.
CONCLUSION

Title I once provided the hope of a nation to make good on the promise of
education as the means of economic mobility for the disadvantaged. It pumped
new funds into the poorest areas of the country and acknowledged that poor
children needed more resources than the average student if they were
realistically expected to succeed on a consistent basis. The financial leverage
that Title I created also allowed the federal government to immediately achieve
far more desegregation in a few years than courts had in a full decade. Yet
today, one would struggle to recognize this rich history in the text and effect of
Title I. If Congress's only fault was in abandoning a worthy mission, it might
simply be criticized as losing its moral compass. But this abandonment of
mission has been accompanied by measures that actually increase and sanction
inequity. The Fourteenth Amendment does not afford Congress this liberty. It
demands that Congress enforce equal protection, not undermine it. As
Congress reauthorizes Title I this year, it must not let conversations of
achievement tests, standards-based reforms, charter schools, and parental
choice further drown out the role that Title I must play in equalizing schools
and meeting the needs of our country's poorest children.35' The means by
which to cure Title I are well within Congress's reach. Poor children can only
35 Both Democrats and Republicans at the highest level have suggested that increasing
the opportunities for parents to send their children to charter schools acts as a panacea to
failing public schools.
See David J. Hoff, McCain Emphasizes School Choice,
Accountability, but Lacks Specifics; Likely Republican Nominee Has Said Little on Trail
About Education, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 20, 2008, at 1, 1-3 (discussing John McCain's position
on education); Larry Rother, Praise for a Rival, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2008, at Al6
(discussing McCain's support of charter schools); The White House, Education,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (indicating
President Obama's intent to invest in charter schools). Research, however, has indicated
that charter schools have significant flaws, including increasing racial segregation. Erica
Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Charter Schools and Race: A Lost Opportunity for
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2002,

http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/vlln32 (revealing that giving parents vouchers or choice resulted
in white flight that perpetuated racial stratification). Moreover, even when local laws
require racial and socioeconomic equity in charter schools, these laws have too often been
unenforced. Camille Wilson Cooper et al., Charter Schools and Racial and Social Class
Segregation: Yet Another Sorting Machine?, in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC
EDUCATION AS AN ENGINE FOR SOCIAL MOBILITY 169, 173 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.,

2000), availableat http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/chpt6.pdf.
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hope that the will to cure Title I is within Congress's reach as well. No less
than their future depends on it.
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